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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Social networking websites have evolved in the United States, 
largely during the past fifteen years, as interactive platforms that en-
able hundreds of millions of members to create, manage, and share 
their interests online.1  The growth rate of the global social media 
industry is truly spectacular, with many American sites becoming 
household names.  LinkedIn, founded in 2003, has evolved into a 
multi-purpose site, centered on building employment networks 
among professionals.2  Facebook, launched in 2004, claims 1.55 bil-
lion monthly active users.3  Twitter, created in 2006, is a real-time 
communications platform that enables users to interact with short 
messages up to 140 characters in length.  Twitter boasts 320 million 
active users monthly who send 500 million Tweets per day.4   
                                               
1 A social networking service is an online service, platform, or site that focuses 
on building and reflecting social networks or social relations among people, 
e.g., who share interests and/or activities.  A social network service essentially con-
sists of a presentation of each user (often a profile), his/her social links, and a vari-
ety of additional services.  Most social network services are web-based and provide 
means for users to interact over the Internet, such as e-mail and instant messaging.  
Online community services are sometimes considered to be a social network ser-
vice, though in a broader sense, social network service usually means an individ-
ual-centered service whereas online community services are group-centered.  Social 
networking sites allow users to share ideas, activities, events, and interests within 
their individual networks.  “Online community services are sometimes classified as 
a social network service, though in a broader sense, social media usually means an 
individual-centered service whereas online community services are group-cen-
tered.  Social networking sites allow users to share ideas, activities, events, and in-
terests within their individual networks.”  Social Networking Services, SCRIBD, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/53943621/Social-Networking-Service (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2015). 
2 See LinkedIn (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/company/linkedin 
(“Founded in 2003, LinkedIn connects the world's professionals to make them more 
productive and successful.  With more than 300 million members worldwide, in-
cluding executives from every Fortune 500 Company, LinkedIn is the world's larg-
est professional network on the Internet.  The company has a diversified business 
model with revenue coming from Talent Solutions, Marketing Solutions and Pre-
mium Subscriptions products.  Headquartered in Silicon Valley, LinkedIn has of-
fices across the globe.www.linkedin.com.”). 
 3 See FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, Our Mission, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com 
/company-info/http://newsroom.fb.com/Company-Info/ (last visited Dec. 5, 
2015) (explaining that Facebook has, “1.55 billion monthly active users as of Sep-
tember 30, 2015”). 
          4 See Twitter Usage, Company Facts, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/com-
pany (last visited Dec. 5, 2015) (noting 320 million monthly active users). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
  
2015] DESTINED TO COLLIDE? 649 
 
The popular assumption is that the United States is number one 
in social networks.  While social media was born in the United 
States, China is now the world’s largest social network marketplace 
by a wide margin.5  As of January 2015, China’s 629 million active 
social media users comprised more than thirty percent of the esti-
mated 2.08 billion global users.6  Seven of the world’s sixteen largest 
social networks in the world are headquartered in the People’s Re-
public of China (“PRC”).7  Renren, China’s equivalent of Facebook, 
had a sign in the employee lounge of at its operational headquarters 
that bragged, "Every day the number of people joining Renren.com 
would fill 230 Tiananmen Squares.”8   
China’s users spend nearly three hours a day on social media, 
outpacing other developing countries.9  China’s social media plat-
forms differ in important ways from their American equivalents, re-
                                               
5 See Facts and Statistics about Social Media in China, STATISTA, http://www.sta-
tista.com/topics/1170/social-networks-in-china/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) 
(“China is the world’s largest social network market.”). 
6 See Steven Millward, The Latest Numbers on Web, Mobile, and Social Media in 
China in Early 2015 (Infographic), TECH IN ASIA, (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.             
techinasia.com/china-web-mobile-data-start-2015/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) 
(“China’s web users have 629 million active social media accounts (from a global 
tally of 2.08 billion).”). 
7 See Cooper Smith, The World’s Twenty-Four Largest Websites and Where Their 
Next Wave of Growth Will Come From, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Nov. 29, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-global-social-media-census-2013-10 (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2015) (depicting the sixteen largest social networks in the world by way 
of a monthly active users infographic).  
8  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and 
Implications for the United States, (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did= 
758650 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
9 See, e.g., Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same, but Different, 
CHINA BUS. REVIEW (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/social-
media-in-china-the-same-but-different/ (explaining that, “Different social media 
usage patterns tell a great deal about the Internet and the country involved.  For 
example, Chinese netizens use online video platforms quite differently, from how 
Americans use YouTube.  Rather than short videos of cute animals or silly domestic 
mishaps that may be popular among YouTube watchers, Youku and Tudou are 
filled with longer form content, up to 70 percent of which is professionally pro-
duced.  Users in China spend up to an hour per day on the sites, compared with 
less than 15 minutes spent by Americans on YouTube.  In the way they present 
programs, the Chinese sites seem more like online television stations or a replace-
ment for digital video recorders.  Though individuals in China produce and post 
videos, a large portion of online video content is longer-format professional videos.  
Much of this content consists of foreign programs pirated, subtitled, and uploaded 
hours after broadcast in the United States.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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flecting “local variations of Internet usage [that] are driven by lan-
guage, culture, levels of economic development, and the underlying 
digital ecosystem.” 10   Chinese young adults report having more 
friends online than offline because of unique demographic factors 
such as the, “rural-to-urban migration that has separated families, 
the loneliness of the one-child generation, and a distrust of infor-
mation from government-controlled media. . . .  In China, more than 
in many countries, social media has become deeply integrated into 
people’s lives.”11 As China enters 2015, as perhaps the largest econ-
omy in the world,12 it is a propitious moment to conduct the first 
audit of the largest Chinese social media providers’ contracting 
practices.13  Increasingly, legal disputes will occur as American so-
cial media sites and services cross China’s virtual borders, and Chi-
nese providers enter the consumer market in the United States.  As 
an illustration, the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
recently warned the Chinese early childhood application developer, 
Babybus, that it was  possibly in violation of the FTC’s regulation 
governing the Children Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”)14 
because it collected “precise geolocation information that is trans-
mitted to third parties, including advertising networks and/or ana-
lytics companies” without parental consent.15  Similarly, an Ameri-
can social media provider that disclaims warranties, asserts caps on 
                                               
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Chinese Century, VANITY FAIR 38, Jan. 2015, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy 
(“When the history of 2014 is written it will take note of a large fact that has received 
little attention: 2014 was the last year in which the United States could claim to be 
the world’s largest economic power.”). 
13 See Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, 
and Implications for the United States, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (ex-
plaining that “[p]rior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization 
36 years ago, China maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, 
centrally-controlled, vastly inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global econ-
omy.  Since opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free 
market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s fastest-growing econo-
mies, with real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging nearly 10% 
through 2014.  In recent years, China has emerged as a major global economic 
power.  It is now the world’s largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis), 
manufacturer, merchandise trader, and holder of foreign exchange reserves.”).  
14 See Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 CFR § 312 (2005) (stating 
regulation as to how businesses can comply with COPPA). 
15 Katie W. Johnson, FTC Warns Developer Its Apps May Violate Children’s Online 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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damages, shortens statutes of limitations, or imposes other unsym-
metrical provisions favoring providers that are ubiquitous in Amer-
ican consumer contracts, are prohibited by the PRC Law on the Pro-
tection of Consumer Rights and Interests, which went into effect on 
March 15, 2014.16  Article 10 of the amended Chinese consumer law 
gives consumers the right to “fair transactions,” which would pro-
hibit the buried or inconspicuous terms in standard-form contracts17 
that are common in U.S. social media agreements.18   
The Chinese legal system’s policing of standard form contracts 
such as online terms of use is not a recent development.  Both the 
recent Chinese contract law revision and the former consumer law 
statute disfavor one-sided standard form contracts.  An American 
                                               
Privacy Act, BLOOMBERG BNA:  ELECTRONIC COMMERCE & LAW REPORT (Dec. 22, 2014) 
(explaining, “BabyBus, which makes its apps available on the Apple iTunes Store, 
Google Play, and Amazon Appstore for Android, markets over 60 free mobile apps 
to children between the ages of one and six, according to the FTC staff's letter.  The 
apps use cartoon characters to teach children about letters, numbers, shapes, music, 
and matching.  Its apps have been downloaded millions of times, the letter said. 
“Several of your apps appear to collect precise geolocation information that is trans-
mitted to third parties, including advertising networks and/or analytics compa-
nies,” the FTC staff said.”). 
16 See CECC.gov, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Jan. 14, 
2014), http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/amendments-to-        
consumer-protection-law-allows-for-public-interest (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); see 
also, People's Republic of China Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of 
Consumers, http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/consumer-protection-law-includ-
ing-2013-amendments/ (“The Decision on Amending the PRC Law on the Protec-
tion of Consumer Rights and Interests was adopted at the 5th Session of the Stand-
ing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress on October 25, 2013, and 
is hereby released to take effect on March 15, 2014.”). 
17 People’s Republic of China Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of 
Consumers, at art. 10 (“Consumers enjoy the right to fair transactions”);  see also, 
Ron Cai and Victoria Ding, Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Rights and 
Interests of Consumers to Take Effect on March 15, 2014, DAVIS, WRIGHT & TREMAINE 
ADVISORY, http://www.dwt.com/Amendments-to-the-Law-on-the-Protection-of-
the-Rights-and-Interests-of-Consumers-to-Take-Effect-on-March-15-2014-01-07-
2014/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“Terms in a standard-form agreement that mate-
rially affect a consumer will be effective only if they are conspicuous and draw the 
consumers' attention to the information about goods or services that has a material 
impact on the consumers”). 
18 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the Worldwide Web:  Re-
forming Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431 (2015) 
(surveying 329 social media terms of use including 188 U.S.-based providers and 
finding key provisions to be inconspicuous; For example, “[s]ocial media providers 
situate arbitration clauses deep within the interior of the TOU.  On average, a con-
sumer would have to read more than ten single spaced pages (4,615 words) before 
reaching the first word of the arbitration clause.”).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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company that includes inconspicuous or anti-consumer terms of use 
for the Chinese marketplace risks individual court actions in Chi-
nese provincial courts or “government-led class action against . . . 
business operators.”19 
China’s social media platforms evolved in relative isolation from 
their American equivalents because the government of China for-
bids its population from accessing most major American social me-
dia sites.  In 2009, China blocked Facebook and Twitter in response 
to riots in Xinjiang.20  The “Great Firewall of China” continues to 
block Facebook,21  but, despite this ban, the social media giant is 
                                               
19 In December 2013, the PRC enacted new consumer laws that created “[a] 
more active consumer protection association.  For the first time, the consumer pro-
tection associations (at the provincial levels) are granted the right to bring lawsuits 
when rights of a large number of consumers are violated.  This type of lawsuit could 
essentially be a government-led class action against private parties, such as busi-
ness operators.  The procedure of such lawsuits is yet to be clarified and 
tested.  Further, for the first time the consumer protection association is officially 
invited to participate in the drafting of consumer protection-related laws and reg-
ulations.” See Amy L. Sommers & Max Gu, China’s New Consumer Protection Law: 
Dramatic Changes Ahead, K&L GATES (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.klgates.com/chi-
nas-new-consumer-protection-law-dramatic-changes-ahead-12-20-20131/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2015) (“On October 25, 2013, China’s President and Chairman of the 
Communist Party of China Xi Jinping signed off on the long-expected revised Law 
on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (the “New Consumer Law”), 
which is believed to be the first major national overhaul on the consumer protection 
legislations in two decades.  The New Consumer Law will become effective on 
China’s Consumer Protection Day of 2014, i.e., March 15, 2014, on which day the 
20-year old current Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (the 
“Previous Consumer Law”) will cease to be effective.”); see also, Ron Cai and Victo-
ria Ding, Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Consum-
ers to Take Effect on March 15, 2014, DAVIS, WRIGHT & TREMAINE ADVISORY, 
http://www.dwt.com/Amendments-to-the-Law-on-the-Protection-of-the-Rights-
and-Interests-of-Consumers-to-Take-Effect-on-March-15-2014-01-07-2014/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2015) (“The China Consumer Association and the Consumer Asso-
ciations at the provincial level may bring lawsuits to the People’s Courts against 
activities detrimental to numerous consumers’ legitimate rights and interests (Ar-
ticle 20 of the Amendments”). 
20 Dana Liebelson, MAP: Here Are Countries That Block Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, Mother Jones (March 28, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2014/03/turkey-facebook-youtube-twitter-blocked (last visited Nov. 10, 2014) 
(“China blocked Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in 2009.  The Twitter and Face-
book bans took place after a peaceful protest by Uighurs, China's Muslim ethnic 
minority, broke into deadly riots in Xinjiang.”);  See also, Thomas Crampton, Social 
Media in China: The Same but the Different, CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW http://www.chi-
nabusinessreview.com/social-media-in-china-the-same-but-       different/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2015). 
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slowly expanding its advertising business in that country.22  Chinese 
nationals have found creative ways to access Facebook, Twitter, and 
other blocked social media sites using Virtual Private Networks, 
proxies or Tor.23  Facebook is expected to launch a dedicated Chi-
nese social media website that conforms to the laws of the PRC in 
the near future.24 
Contrary to Western assumptions, it is threats to the social order, 
not criticism of the government officials, which generally leads to 
censorship: 
[I]f you write a social media post in China that criticizes the 
government, it is no more likely to be censored than if you 
write one supporting the government.  What we discovered 
in stead is that they censor any effort at collective action – 
any attempt to move people, controlled by someone outside 
of government.25 
                                               
banned-china.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
22 Alyssa Abkowitz, Facebook Woos Chinese Advertisers: Social-Media Firm Wages 
Campaign to Draw More Business from Chinese Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-woos-chinese-advertisers-1427659098 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
23 See, e.g., How to Do Anything, How to Successfully Access Facebook in China, 
WIKIHOW, http://www.wikihow.com/Successfully-Access-Facebook-in-China 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (providing a guide on how to circumvent Chinese blocks 
on Internet access to use desired sites such as Facebook);  Cooper Smith, The World’s 
Twenty-Four Largest Social Media Sites, and Where Their Next Wave of Growth Will Come 
From, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-
global-social-media-census-2013-10 (last visited Feb. 10, 2015)( “It is estimated that 
despite its banning, Facebook has almost as many users in China as in the U.S.”). 
24 See Fahad Saleem, Facebook Inc. (FB) Dedicated Version for China Coming in 
2015, TECHINSIDER (Dec. 26, 2014) (announcing forthcoming version of Facebook for 
China); Julia Greenberg, Facebook Says It Has Advertisers in China Despite the Ban, 
WIRED (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/facebook-says-it-has-ad-
vertisers-in-china-despite-ban/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2015) (explaining that, Facebook 
is in China in ways that we might not think about.  On this point, Mark Zuckerberg 
said, “For now, the thing that I would leave you with—people think Facebook isn’t 
in China at all, and that’s actually not true.  Our consumer service isn’t active there, 
but it actually is already one of the biggest advertising markets that we have.”). 
25 “If many people write that the political leaders of this town are stealing 
money, have mistresses, etc., that’s no problem, but if you say “and let’s go protest,” 
and what you say is connected to some real world event, your post will be censored.  
In fact, if you say the leaders of this other town are doing such a great job, we should 
all meet in the town square to have a rally for them, that post will also be censored.” 
Gary King, Social Media Analysis Finds Unexpected Reasons for China’s Censorship, 
CRIMSON HEXAGON, http://www.crimsonhexagon.com/business-intelligence/     
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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Chinese police “have routinely tried to crack down on alleged online 
rumors, at times even arresting people” for postings that undermine 
national harmony and political stability on social media sites.26  
Government mandated restrictions on free speech, which are 
unenforceable in Western legal systems, are incorporated in most 
Chinese social media’s terms of use.  Similarly, there are numerous 
American-style limitations of liability and warranty disclaimer 
clauses in social media agreements that contravene Chinese con-
sumer law.  This Article juxtaposes Chinese and American social 
media terms of use in order to shed light on the potential clash over 
legal variations between these two social media superpowers.  The 
rapidly expanding social media sites in both nations will likely re-
sult in expensive and time-consuming legal conflicts, unless provid-
ers in both countries localize their boilerplate for a globalized social 
media world.  
This article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I presents a summary 
of the principal attributes of the Chinese social media landscape.  
Our analysis of twenty-five of China’s foremost social media sites 
reveals that Chinese users are more active creators of content than 
their American counterparts.  Chinese social networks are primarily 
focused on self-expression through blogs, micro blogs, and e-com-
merce, while the much smaller American social media universe em-
phasizes the passive consumption of content created by social net-
works and shared interest communities.  Part II analyzes and 
compares the terms of use of Facebook, Twitter, and Match.com 
with six of their Chinese equivalents.27  Key liability limiting clauses 
such as the choice of forum, choice of law, warranty disclaimers, 
caps on damages, pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, anti-
class waivers, and user conduct clauses vary sharply between the 
United States and China.  Chinese terms of use address the relation-
ship between the user, national security and the public order.  In 
contrast, American terms of use are, in effect, rights foreclosure 
                                               
social-analytics/government/social-media-analysis-finds-reasons-for-china-cen-
sorship (last visited Feb.  9, 2015). 
26 Michael Kan, In China, ‘Defaming Cultural Icons’ Online Can Land You in Jail, 
TECHHIVE, (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.techhive.com/article/2047103/china-ar-
rests-two-for-using-the-internet-to-defame-cultural-icon.html (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015). 
27 The U.S. sample included: Flixster, Reddit, Imgur, Steam, Hi5, Match.com, 
FriendFinder, Orkut, Scribd, Tumblr, Technocrati, Yahoo!Group, TripAdvisor, Pin-
terest, Club Penguin, Academia, LinkedIn, Vine, Klout, WhatsApp, Twitter, Skype, 
Facebook, Google+, and YouTube. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
  
2015] DESTINED TO COLLIDE? 655 
 
clauses that protect the rights of corporate social media providers 
while minimizing the rights and remedies of consumers. 
Part III is an empirical study that investigates differences between 
terms of use employed by the top twenty-five social media provid-
ers in China and a functionally equivalent sample of the largest U.S. 
social media providers.  This larger study reaches conclusions simi-
lar to the findings in Part II, which are explained by our examina-
tion of contrasts between Chinese and American consumer law.  
Chinese social media providers are less likely to impose warranty 
disclaimers, limitations on remedies, or pre-dispute mandatory arbi-
tration because Chinese contract and consumer law disfavors stand-
ard form contracts that foreclose consumer rights.  In contrast, 
American courts will not enforce provisions that ban religious 
speech and criticism of the government that are posted on social 
media because these provisions are inimical to the First Amend-
ment.  Similarly, American terms of use are unenforceable in the 
People’s Republic of China because they privilege corporate actors 
over the rights of consumers.  Social media websites in the United 
States and China have global ambitions and must devise user agree-
ments that harmonize with the laws and policies of countries where 
they target users. 
2.  PART I:                                                                                                                                  
TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
2.1.  Overview of Social Media in China 
 
The PRC’s social media websites are a transformative force in 
Chinese culture.28  The Chinese social network sites are evolving 
separately from their American counterparts such as Facebook, In-
stagram and Twitter in large part because these giant American-
based sites have been blocked in the PRC for lack of conformity to 
                                               
28 See Elin Box, A Guide to Chinese Social Media: What to Do about It and How to 
Do It, WEBCERTAIN, (Feb. 17, 2014), http://blog.webcertain.com/a-guide-to-chi-
nese-social-media-what-to-do-and-how-to-do-it/17/02/2014/?gclid=CIfMmZ_ 
Uv8MCFdNj7AodImkA2g (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (arguing that social media in 
China is very popular, but particularized). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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Chinese legal and cultural practices.29  The Chinese “appetite for all 
things social has spawned a dizzying array of companies, many 
with tools more advanced than those in the West: for example, Chi-
nese users were able to embed multimedia content in social media 
more than 18 months before Twitter users could do so in the United 
States.”30  Youthful entrepreneurs in China are using social media to 
crowdfund their projects, allowing them to raise seed money they 
might not get from venture capital.31  Many of these projects are es-
tablished through Chinese e-commerce giant, Jingdong’s crowd-
funding platform because of the scarcity of angel investors.32   
Chinese indigenous social media principally targets the Chinese 
population and is chiefly available in the Chinese language, but it is 
rapidly expanding its global reach.33  Baidu, the developer of Baidu 
Tieba, for example, is headquartered in Beijing, China, but has 
opened business offices in “Shanghai, major cities in Guangdong 
Province, Japan, USA, Thailand, Brazil, Egypt and Indonesia.”34  The 
social networks in our Chinese sample represent the twenty-five 
                                               
29 See Doug Tsuroka, China Ousts U.S. Social Media Firms: A Question of Control, 
INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 31, 2011), (“U.S.-based social media sites today are 
blocked by China's so-called Great Firewall and can't be accessed locally.  They in-
clude Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr and Foursquare.”).  
30 Cindy Chiu, Chris Ip, & Ari Silverman, Understanding Social Media in China, 
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Apr. 2012), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/market-
ing_sales/understanding_social_media_in_china (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
31 The Securities Association of China recently released the “Measures for the 
Administrating of Private Equity Crowdfunding (Draft)” in December 2014.  See 
Question 2 of Press Conference on December 26, 2014 of the China Securities and 
Regulatory Commission, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/              
newsfacts/PressConference/201501/t20150113_266540.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2015). 
32 See Chinese E-Commerce Giant Jingdong Launches Crowdfunding Platform, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER, http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/07/43214-                   
chinesee-commerce-giant-jingdong-launches-crowdfunding-platform/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2015) (discussing the launch of Jingdong’s crowdfunding platform as 
modeled after the presently largest crowdfunding site in China, Demohour). 
33 See Andrew Taylor, 5 Things to Know about Chinese Social Media and 4 Ways to 
Succeed: Focus on Buyers’ Needs and Stick To Your Brand Identity, INMAN (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.inman.com/2014/01/29/five-things-to-know-about-chinese-social-
media-and-four-ways-to-succeed/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (“[C]hinese social me-
dia is entirely in the Chinese language . . . .”). 
34 Investor FAQs, BAIDU, http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p= 
irol-faq_pf#26140 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
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largest social media providers: 35   51.com, 36  Baihe, 37  Baishehui, 38 
Baidu Tieba,39 Douban,40 Jiayuan,41 Kaixin001,42 Mogujie,43 Momo,44 
Mop, 45  Netease Weibo, 46  Renren, 47  Sina Weibo, 48  Sohu Weibo, 49 
                                               
35 Wenzhuo Liu selected the sample of the twenty-five social media sites, lo-
cated their terms of use, and completed English translations. 
36 Crunchbase, 51.COM, http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/51-com 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“51.com is a provider of social network application ser-
vices, production, and relevant technology.  The company aims to offer users a pos-
itive experience in network production and promotes the progress of social net-
works in China.”); Terms of Service, 51.COM, passport.51.com/index/agreement (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
37 Terms of Service, BAIHE, http://help.baihe.com/index.php?action=list&cat=  
573&listid=28# (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  
          38 Terms of Service, BAIHU SHEHUI, http://bai.sohu.com/user/reg/infoshow.do 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (Chinese and English translation on file with authors). 
39 Terms of Service, BAIDU SPACE, http://passport.baidu.com/static/passpc-    
account/html/protocal.html (English and Chinese translations on file with au-
thors). 
40 Terms of Service, DOUBAN, http://www.douban.com/about/agreement (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015); Terms of Service, BAIHE, http://help.baihe.com/index.php?ac-
tion=list&cat=573&listid=28# (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
41 Terms of Service, JIAYUAN, http://reg.jiayuan.com/clause.php (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
42 Terms of Service, KAIXIN001, http://www.kaixin001.com/s/reg.html (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
           43 Network Services Agreement, MUSHROOM STREET, http://www.mogujie.com/ 
trade/faq/index?id=1ii&type=1&ptp=1.BYy2DHHo. GSEiYUOK.36.R9abNO (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015) (English Translations on file with authors). 
44 Terms of Service, MOMO, http://www.immomo.com/agreement.html (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
45 Terms of Service, MOP, http://www.mop.com/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) 
(English translation on file with authors). 
46 See Xie Tingting, NetEase Closes Microblogging Service, CRI ENGLISH (Nov. 11, 
2014), http://english.cri.cn/12394/2014/11/06/1261s851265.htm (“NetEase, one 
of the leading online service providers in China, has closed its weibo microblogging 
service and is encouraging its users to try another social-networking service called 
Lofter.”). 
47 Terms of Service, RENREN, http://renren.com/info/agreement.jsp (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
48 Terms of Service, SINA WEIBO, http://weibo.com/signup/v5/protocol (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
          49 Terms of Service, SOHU WEIBO, https://passport.sohu.com/regist/agreement 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
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Taojianghu,50  TaoMee,51  Tencent QQ,52  Tencent QZone,53  Tencent 
Pengyou,54 Tencent Weibo,55 WeChat,56  Tianya,57 Tuding,58 Ushi,59 
and Youku/Tudou.60  Tencent, the developer of the oldest messag-
ing app in China, Tencent QQ, is the parent company for five of the 
                                               
          50 Terms of Service, TAOJIANGHU, http://www.taobao.com/go/chn/mem-
ber/agreement.php?spm=a2145.7268393.0.0.Mj0ub8 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (Eng-
lish translation on file with authors). Taojianghu is the social networking service 
that evolved out of was grafted onto Taobao.com, Alibaba's auction and retail Web 
site.  Owen Fletcher, China’s Alibaba adds Social Networking to E-commerce, PCWORLD, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/169575/article.html.   
51 Terms of Service, TAOME, http://www.61.com/about/service.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
52 Service Agreement, TENCENT QQ, http://www.qq.com/contract.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015) (Tencent QQ users are subject to Tencent Terms of Service 
Agreement and QQ Number Rule.); QQ Number Rules, 
http://zc.qq.com/chs/agreement1_chs.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (English 
translations on file with authors). 
53 See Tencent Qzone: The Largest Social Media Website in China, CHINA INTERNET 
WATCH, http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/tag/qzone/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015) (“Qzone was created in 2005 by Tencent.  It allows users to customize their 
blogs, keep diaries, send photos and listen to music.  Gradually, Qzone has trans-
formed from a personal space to the biggest social network open platform, and its 
monthly active users grew to more than 600 million.”).   
          54 Service Agreement, TENCENT PENGYOU, http://reg.pengyou.com/agree-
ment_office.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (English translation on file with authors). 
Tencent Pengyou is Tencent’s Real Name Social Network. 
55 Service Agreement, TENCENT WEIBO, http://reg.t.qq.com/agreement.php 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (English translations on file with authors).  
56 The Tencent Company owns Tencent QQ, Tencent Qzone, Tencent Pengyou, 
Tencent Weibo and WeChat. Terms of Service, WECHAT, http://weixin.qq.com/ 
agreement?lang=zh_CN (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (English translations on file with 
authors). 
57 Terms of Use, TIANYA, http://service.tianya.cn/guize/regist.do (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015) (English translations on file with authors). 
58 Terms of Use, TUDING, http://www.tuding001.com/terms (last visited Feb. 
7, 2015) (English translations on file with authors). 
59 See Hannah Seligson, Ushi Links in Mainland China, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2012/0116/companies-people-dominic-
penaloza-linkedin-connecting-china.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“Goldman 
Sachs, McKinsey & Co., Sequoia Capital, Yum Brands, Taobao, Vancl, IBM, Dell 
and Zynga have posted openings on Ushi Jobs, a portal of 6,000 listings of well-
paying positions”).  Terms of Use, USHI, http://www.ushi.com/doc.jhtml?key= 
term_of_service (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
60 See Youku Press Release, Youku Tudou Awarded MVNO License (Nov. 21, 
2014), http://ir.youku.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=241246&p=irol-newsArticle&id= 
1992027 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“Youku Tudou Inc. (NYSE: YOKU) is China's 
leading Internet television company.  Its Youku and Tudou Internet television plat-
forms enable users to search, view and share high-quality video content quickly 
and easily across multiple devices.  Its Youku brand and Tudou brand are the most 
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twenty-five social media sites in our Chinese sample: Tencent QQ, 
Qzone, Pengyou, Tencent Weibo, and WeChat.  Social networks are 
an alternative source of information with “government bodies open-
ing 258,700 microblog and 6,000 WeChat accounts to release official 
information and make contact with people.”61   
Each Chinese social-media and e-commerce platform has at least 
two major local players.  In microblogging (or Weibo), for example, 
Sina Weibo and Tencent are Chinese equivalents of Twitter.62  Large 
                                               
recognized online video brands in China.  Youku Tudou's American depositary 
shares, each representing 18 of Youku Tudou's Class A ordinary shares, are traded 
on the NYSE under the symbol ‘YOKU.’’); YOUKU TUDOU INC, SEC Form 6-
K (filed on Nov. 18, 2014).  Youku, Terms of Use, http://www.youku.com/pub/ 
youku/ service/ agreement.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Tudou, Terms of Use, 
http://www.tudou.com/about/account.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (English 
translation on file with authors). 
61 China Focus: China Issues Report on Press, Highlights Boom of New Media, 
XINHUA ECONOMIC NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 29, 2014) (explaining how the Chinese gov-
ernment is employing social media to give citizens information as to services). 
62 See Steven Millward, China’s Forgotten 3rd Twitter Clone Hits 260 Million Us-
ers, TECH IN ASIA (Oct. 12, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/chinas-forgotten-3rd-
twitter-clone-041051048.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (reporting on the companies’ 
announcement of exceeding 260 million users and thereby remaining the third larg-
est microblogging service in China); Sina Weibo Imposes Ban on WeChat Promotion, 
GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/1128/ 
c90778-8815200.html, last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (“WeChat, called ‘weixin’ in Chinese, 
is owned by Shenzhen-based Tencent, and had 468 million monthly active users in 
the third quarter.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
660 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
 
Facebook equivalents include Renren,63 with 219 million active us-
ers,64 Tencent PengYou,65 and Kaixin001, with 120,123 unique visi-
tors per day.66  China’s social networks often outpace their Ameri-
can counterparts in adapting new technologies.  For example, 
“Chinese users were able to embed multimedia content in social me-
dia more than 18 months before Twitter users could do so in the 
United States.”67  Table One, below, is a typology of the top twenty-
five social media providers in China.  
 
  
                                               
63 See Yin Mei, 5 Chinese Social Networks You Need to Watch, MASHABLE (July 12, 
2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/02/china-social-networks/ (last visited Feb. 
9, 2015) (“Think of RenRen as China's Facebook.  After a fierce competition with 
Kaixin (www.kaixin001.com), Renren has come out on top.  Originally, Renren lost 
a lawsuit about its domain name — www.kaixin.com — because it was so closer to 
Kaixin's.  Still, Renren managed to retain ownership of that url, which now re-di-
rects to its site . . . .  Renren is poised to take over as the social networking platform 
for the college-educated population in China.”). 
64 See CIW Team, Renren Had 219 Million MAUs, Less Login Users in Q3 2014, 
CHINA INTERNET WATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/ 
10928/Renren-q3-2014/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (“RenRen.com had approxi-
mately 219 million activated users as of September 30, 2014.  And, its monthly 
unique log-in users in September 2014 was approximately 44 million, compared to 
approximately 50 million in September 2013 according to RenRen unaudited finan-
cial results.”). 
65 See Julie, Ten Chinese Social Media Sites You Should Be Following, SYNTHESIO 
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://synthesio.com/corporate/en/2013/uncategorized/10-     
chinese-social-media-sites-you-should-be-following/# (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) 
(“PengYou, meaning “Friend”, was developed by Tencent to be a “facebook-like” 
site.  Although, PengYou has less active users than its direct competitors Renren 
and Weibo, because of its multiple platforms, it’s the biggest online community in 
China in terms of registered users.”).  
        66 See Hypestat: Website Analysis and Statistics, KAIXIN, http://kaixin001.com.hy 
pestat.com/ (explaining that “Kaixin001.com receives about 120,123 unique visitors 
and 815,638 (6.79 per visitor) page views per day which should earn about 
$960.99/day from advertising revenue.  Estimated site value is $3,045,682.54.  Ac-
cording to Alexa Traffic Rank kaixin001.com is ranked number 4,521 in the world 
and 0.0261% of global Internet users visit it.  This site has Google page rank of 7.  
Site is hosted in Beijing, 22, China and links to network IP address 27.131.222.21”); 
see also Kaixin001, http://www.crunchbase.com/                organization/kaixin (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2015) (Kaixin is a Chinese Social Networking Service For White-
Collar Urbanites, Providing Tools Such as Blogging, Photo Sharing, and Social 
Games.”); Richard Simcott, Social Media Fast Facts: China, SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (Feb. 
27, 2015), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/social-media-fast-facts-
china (summarizing the most popular social networks in China). 
67 Cindy Chiu, Chris Ip, & Ari Silverman, Understanding Social Media in China, 
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/marketing_sales/ 
understanding_social_media_in_china (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
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Table One: Typology of Chinese Social Network’s Predominant Purpose 




Percentage of                 
Sample 
Messaging/Blogs 1. Sina Weibo 
2. Tencent Weibo 
3. Sohu Weibo 
4. Netease Weibo 
5. Tencent QQ 
6. WeChat 









20%  (N=5) 




2. Kaixin 001 
3. Tencent Pengyou 
4. Baishehui 
5. Tencent Qzone 
20% (N=5) 









Social Pinboards 1. Taojianghu 
2. Mogujie 
8% (N=2) 
Shared Interest 1. Douban 4% (N=1) 
Professional &         
Business 
1. Ushi 4% (N=1) 
 
“Messaging and blogs” is the largest Chinese social media cate-
gory, followed by virtual communities and Facebook-like social con-
nection sites.  Three of the top twenty-five Chinese social media sites 
are dating sites.  Two social networks each are classified as multi-
media sharing and social pin board sites.  Professional networking 
and shared interest sites had only one platform among the Chinese 
top twenty-five social media websites. 
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2.1.1.  Blogs, Microblogs, and Messaging 
 
Blogs, microblogs, and instant messaging comprise twenty-four 
percent of the Chinese social network sample. 68   Sina Weibo, 69 
founded in 2009, 70  claims 281 million users, more than twice as 
many as Twitter.71  Tencent Weibo, Sohu Weibo, and Netease Weibo 
are other leading microblog sites.  Tencent QQ, also known as QQ, 
is not just an instant messaging software service but also offers mi-
croblogging, games, shopping, and group voice chat.72   WeChat, 
China’s equivalent to WhatsApp, features Facebook-like social ele-
ments such as “moments,” which enables users to see updates from 
friends and businesses much like the Facebook timeline.73  WeChat 
is not just for instant messaging, but also incorporates multiple func-
tions including a “social network system, part e-commerce platform 
                                               
68 These websites are Netease Weibo, Sina Weibo, Sohu Weibo, Tencent QQ, 
Tencent Qzone, Tencent Weibo, and WeChat. “Weibo” is the Chinese word for “mi-
croblog.” 
69 See Yin Mei, Five Chinese Social Networks You Need to Watch, MASHABLE (July 
12, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/02/china-social-networks/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2015) (“Simply describing Sina Weibo as the Twitter of China understates 
Weibo's unique capabilities and leadership role in the Chinese social media sphere.  
With more than twice as many users as Twitter, Sina Weibo is an essential platform 
to more than 22% of the Chinese Internet population.  Part of its popularity can be 
attributed to the ability of users to include images and video, something Twitter is 
only now beginning to allow.”). 
70 See Sina Weibo Imposes Ban on WeChat Promotion, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov.28, 
2014), http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/1128/c90778-8815200.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2015) (Sina Weibo, China's version of Twitter has effectively banned 
users from promoting the country's most popular messaging app WeChat on its 
platform as the two Internet giants battle for users.).   
71 Id. 
           72 See Tencent QQ Instant Messaging Service, TENCENT QQ, http://www.ten-
cent.com/en-us/ps/imservice.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (“Tencent QQ pro-
vides total solution for Internet-based instant messaging (IM) platform.  It supports 
comprehensive basic online communication functions, including text messaging, 
video and voice chat as well as online (offline) file transmission.  It also supports 
cross platform communication between PC and wireless terminals.  The new 
QQ2009 edition is fully compatible with Windows XP, Vista, Linux, Mac and other 
systems.  Meanwhile, the third-generation QQ with "Hummer" as its core has 
strengthened the integration of various Internet services to build a complete, ma-
ture and diversified online life platform for users.”). 
73 See Miquel Roberg, The Five Top Social Media Networks in China, MAXIMIZE 
SOCIAL BUSINESSES (Mar. 25, 2014), http://maximizesocialbusiness.com/5-top-so-
cial-media-networks-china-12918/ (noting popular social network in China, 
WeChat’s, utilization of Facebook-like social features). 
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and part marketing tool.”74  WeChat is “by far the most used mobile 
social network” because it “is great for sharing pictures and keeping 
in contact with friends using the video and voice messaging func-
tions.”75 
 
2.1.2.  Virtual Communities   
 
Baidu Tieba, Mop, TianYa, Taomee, and 51.com are virtual com-
munities that account for twenty percent of the top twenty-five so-
cial networks in China.  Baidu Tieba, an interactive social platform, 
claims 300 million monthly users and one billion overall regis-
trants.76  Oak Pacific, the developer of news groups, gaming com-
munities, and virtual entertainment, founded Mop.com, which is 
the Chinese equivalent of “MySpace” (hi.mop.com), along with a 
powerful forum (dzh.mop.com).77  Originally founded in 1997, Mop 
has evolved into a “rich interactive entertainment platform.” 78  
TianYa, which claims seventy-eight million users is an interactive 
forum79 on a variety of topics, including business, politics, sports, 
entertainment, as well as academic research.80  “Taomee Holdings 
                                               
74 See generally Misha Maruma, The Complete Guide to China’s Major Social Net-
works, NANJING MARKETING GROUP (May 16, 2014), http://www.nanjingmarketing-
group.com/blog/complete-guide-china-social-media#ixzz3Nb4V92j4 (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2015). 
75 Id.  
           76 See generally Baidu Tieba, CHINA INTERNET WATCH, http://www.chinainter-
netwatch.com/tag/baidu-tieba/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (providing the most re-
cent statistics on Baidu Tieba’s users). 
77 See Btrax Staff, Hello, Mop Hi – New Social Networking Site by Oak Pacific, 
BTRAX, http://blog.btrax.com/en/2009/08/29/hello-mop-hi-new-social-network-
ing-site-by-oak-pacific/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (reporting on Oak Pacific’s an-
nouncement of its new social networking site, Hi.mop.com). 
78 China SNS Snapshot #: Mop.com, Another ‘MySpace’ for Self-Proclaiming (Dec. 
13, 2009), https://jared840.wordpress.com/2009/12/13/china-sns-snapshot-mop-
com-another-myspace-for-self-proclaiming/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
79 China Internet Marketing, GLOGOU, http://glogou.com/china-online-mar-
keting/tianya.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (“Founded in February 1999, 
Tianya.cn is an Internet forum registered in the Hainan province in China.  It pro-
vides BBS, blog, microblogging, and photo sharing services.  Tianya.cn provides 
forum on a variety of topics, including politics, entertainment, sports, as well as 
academic research.  As of August 2011, it had approximately 56 million registered 
users.”). 
80 Your Successful Marketing Campaigns in China starts here, GLOGOU, 
http://glogou.com/china-online-marketing/tianya.php / (last visited Feb. 16, 
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Limited is a children's entertainment and media company in China 
. . . [that has] expanded into various online and offline platforms, 
including the virtual worlds.”81  The largest social network service 
provider in China, 51.com, is “jointly invested [in] by Sequoia Cap-
ital, SIG Asia Investments (SAI), Giant Interactive, Intel Capital, 
Redpoint Ventures, and a few others.”  This virtual community has 
160 million registered users.82 
 
2.1.3.  General Social Connection (Facebook Equivalents) 
  
Twenty percent of the twenty-five Chinese sites are Facebook 
clones, or functional equivalents.  No one Chinese social media site 
is an exact equivalent of Facebook, but Renren, Kaixin001, Tencent 
Pengyou, Tencent Qzone and Baishehui have imported many simi-
lar features.83  Renren describes itself as the network for everyone: 
Renren Inc. operates a leading real-name social networking 
internet platform in China.  Renren, which means ‘Everyone’ 
in Chinese, enables users to connect and communicate with 
each other, share information, create user generated content, 
play online games, watch videos and enjoy a wide range of 
other features and services.  We believe real name relation-
ships create a stronger and more enduring social graph that 
is essential in the mobile internet world and difficult to rep-
                                               
2015). 
           81 Taomee Holdings Limited, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news 
/business/companies/taomee-holdings-ltd/index.html (“The Company's online 
entertainment community, www.61.com, hosts virtual worlds by children in the 
five to 15 age groups in the People's Republic of China.”). 
82 Steven Chow, 51.com, CHINA ONLINE MARKETING, http://www.china-
online-marketing.com/news/china-tech-companies/51-com/ (last updated June 
20, 2010).). 
83 Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same but Different, CHINA 
BUSINESS REV. (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/social-media-
in-china-the-same-but-different/ (last visited Feb 5, 2015) (“Facebook holds sway 
as the default social network, gathering all demographics. The same does not hold 
true in China, where a handful of social networks attract segmented audiences, 
ranging from upmarket urban youth to university students and migrant workers”). 
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licate.  As of June 30, 2015, our social network had approxi-
mately 227 million activated users with over 80% of user 
time accessing our services through mobile.84 
Bai Shehui, known as a “white-collar society,”85 “is a real-name-
registered social network site organized by Sohu, one of China's 
largest Internet portals.”86  Founded in May 2009, the site features 
blogs, photos, music, gifts, and games, and its primary users are pur-
ported to be working professionals.  As of March 2011, Bai Shehui 
had at least 30 million registered users, with 5.2 million active us-
ers.87 
 
2.1.4.  Dating Social Media Sites 
 
Three of the twenty-five Chinese sites (12%) were rating, dating, 
and mating social media.  Jiayuan, for example, has evolved in large 
part because of China’s rapid urbanization.88  The dating site’s typi-
cal customers include “blue-collar workers who migrated from 
towns to big cities in recent years” and “recently urbanized young 
women” who are “living on their own after migrating to big cities 
for work and . . . [who find] online dating a practical way to seek a 
husband.”89  Jiayuan has “more than 5.7 million active monthly us-
ers and 110 million registered users – three times larger than either 
                                               
          84 Investor Relations Overview, RENREN, http://ir.renren-inc.com/phoe-
nix.zhtml?c=244796&p=irol-irhome (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
85  “White-collar society," also known as Bai Shehui in Chinese, is a real-name-
registered social network site organized by Sohu, one of China's largest internet 
portals. Founded in May 2009, the site features blogs, photos, music, gifts, and 
games, and its primary users are purported to be white collar.” China.org.cn, Top 
15 Social Networks in China (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2011-05/12/content_22548834_4.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2015). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. (“As of March 2011, it had at least 30 million registered users, with 5.2 
million active users.”). 
88 Eric Johnson, Matchmaker Jiayuan Rides Past Baidu on China’s Urbanization 
Wave, THE STREET (Sep. 5, 2014), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12869073/1/ 
matchmaker-jiayuan-rides-past-baidu-on-chinas-urbanization-wave.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2015). 
89 Id.  
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of its competitors, Zhenai and Baihe.”90  Baihe, founded in 2005, is a 
leading Chinese dating social network: 
It is categorized as a professional dating social network site 
with high efficiency, quality and credibility.  Each registered 
user must answer a 30-minute love-related psychological 
test, and then Baihe recommends proper individuals to date 
according to test results.  As of March 2011, the site had more 
than 23 million registered users—most of them white-collar 
workers—and Alexa CN ranks it the 412th most popular 
website.91 
Beijing Momo Technology Company independently created 
Momo, a leading Chinese dating application, while Alibaba partially 
financed this social media venture.92  Momo’s founder was a former 
employee of NetEase, which launched the microblogging site Ne-
tEase Weibo in 2007.  Momo enables its Chinese users “to connect 
with people in your immediate area, using geo-positioning, for 
quick hook-ups.  It is popular amongst foreigners and Chinese stu-
dents.”93   
 
2.1.5.  Multi-Media Sharing 
 
Two of the twenty-five Chinese social networks (8%) were 
Multi-Media Sharing sites.  YouKu/Todou, China’s top YouTube-
like video sharing sites, were also content-creators where users 
shared multi-media content.94  China’s multi-media social networks 
                                               
90 Id. 
91 Lin Liyao, Top 15 Social Networks in China, CHINA.ORG.CN (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2011-05/12/content_22548834_2.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2015). 
92 Owen Fletcher, China’s Alibaba adds Social Networking to E-commerce, 
PCWORLD, http://www.pcworld.com/article/169575/article.html (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015) (“Alibaba is crafting social-networking platforms specifically to com-
plement two of its core operations. The beta version of a Web site with Facebook-
style applications and a Twitter-style feed is being grafted onto Taobao.com, Aliba-
ba's auction and retail Web site”). 
93 Misha Maruma, The Complete Guide to China’s Major Social Networks, NANJING 
MARKETING GROUP (May 16, 2014), http://www.nanjingmarketinggroup.com/ 
blog/complete-guide-china-social-media#ixzz3Nb4V92j4 (last visited Feb. 14, 
2015). 
94 Steven Millward, Shareholders Approve: Youku and Tudou Sitting in a Tree, M-
E-R-G-I-N-G, TECHINASIA (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.techinasia.com/ youku-
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tend to incorporate more pirated and professionally produced con-
tent than YouTube: 
Rather than short videos of cute animals or silly domestic 
mishaps that may be popular among YouTube watchers, 
Youku and Tudou are filled with longer form content, up to 
70 percent of which is professionally produced.  Users in 
China spend up to an hour per day on the sites, compared 
with less than 15 minutes spent by Americans on YouTube.  
In the way they present programs, the Chinese sites seem 
more like online television stations or a replacement for dig-
ital video recorders.95 
Tuding is an Instagram-like photo filter and sharing site.96  Ra-
ther than a direct copy of Instagram, Tuding users can offer voice 
responses to their friends’ photos.97 
 
2.1.6.  Social Pinboards and Shopping Sites 
 
Tiaojianghu and Mogujie are Chinese social networking plat-
forms for on-line shoppers.  Taobao, the largest Chinese e-commerce 
site, created Taojianghu in 2009, “aiming for reinforcing connections 
between its customers for trustworthy online shopping experience 
which would in turn, leads to increased transactions.”98  Mogujie, 
China’s Pinterest equivalent, also combines online shopping experi-
ence with a virtual bulletin board.99  This social pinboard site focuses 
                                               
tudou-shareholders-agree-merger/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (explaining that 
YouKu and Tudou, once multi-media rivals, have joined forces in a merger in 2012).   
95 Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same But Different, CHINA 
BUSINESS REV. (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/social-        me-
dia-in-china-the-same-but-different/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
96 Yasmin Li, Tuding User Statistics – Photo, Weibo, LBS. What’s Next, TECHNODE 
(May 9, 2011) http://technode.com/2011/05/09/tuding-user-statistics-photo-
weibo-lbs-sns/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
97 Audio is in! New Photo Sharing Social Media, THEM, http://www.them.pro/ 
Tuding (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
98 Ben Jiang, China Social Commerce Landscape: Fall Of The Giant And Rise Of The 
Startups, TECHNODE (May 31, 2011), http://technode.com/2011/05/31/china-       
social-commerce-landscape-fall-of-the-giant-and-rise-of-the-startups/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). 
99  Id., (“Mogujie is a buyer-based social network service that provides services 
to female internet users in China.”). 
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on “female users, with front page categories for women’s clothing, 
shoes, handbags, home furnishings, and the like.”100  A substantial 
amount of all pinned items head to the largest e-commerce site, 
Taobao.com.101  With more than 80 million registered users, and 7 
million daily active users,102 Mogujie is a social networking hybrid 
that features social media and e-commerce.103 
2.1.7.  Shared Interests 
 
Douban, a social review site where users swap recommenda-
tions for books, music and films, is the only Chinese shared-interest 
social media site in the sample.  Chinese shared interest sites are far 
less developed than its general social networks, blogging, mi-
croblogging, messaging, or virtual communities.  Douban’s niche is 
young people who self-identify as hipsters: 
It is where “cool” young Chinese hang out – they have (or 
pretend to have) good tastes in book, music, and movies.  
Most of them have their own blogs, independent or free.  
They know how to shoot awesome photos, can write power-
ful or sad words, share their views on Nietzsche or Schopen-
hauer and want to express their love for John Lennon and 
the Beatles.104 
 
2.1.8.  Professional & Educational Networks 
 
                                               
100 Steven Millward, Mogujie: China’s Biggest Pinterest Clone is a Social Commerce 
Money Machine, TECHINASIA (Apr. 16, 2011), https://www.techi-
nasia.com/mogujie-social-commerce-success-in-china-taobao/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015). 
101 Id.  
102 About Us, MOGUJIE, http://www.mogujie.com/us/?ptp=1.Bvij3Gw2._ 
foot.4.x5w4wD (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
103 Millward, supra note 100, (“Mogujie.com, according to its own stats, has 
quickly grown to have 9.5 million registered users by the end of last month, of 
whom 2.2 million are active daily visitors who browse about 750,000 items on 
Taobao every day, and end up buying 60,000 of those. Yes, 60,000 actual online or-
ders each day from its users. That’s some serious social commerce right there.”). 
           104 One Word, One SNS, CHINESE SEO SHIFU, http://                                                                 
chineseseoshifu.com/blog/one-word-one-sns.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2015); 
Mogujie, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/mogujie (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
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Chinese companies and foreign firms doing business in China 
are increasingly using social media to recruit employees and to ad-
vertise the positive features of their companies.  Only one of the top 
twenty-five Chinese social media were classifiable as professional 
and educational sites.  Ushi, founded in 2010105  by one hundred 
China-based entrepreneurs and executives,106 is the Chinese equiv-
alent of LinkedIn.  Ushi is “a fast-growing business social network-
ing service that is connecting China’s white collar professionals and 
entrepreneurs via mobile phones and PCs, making it easier to find 
new customers, jobs, experts, and contacts”107 with 1.2 million reg-
istrants.  Like LinkedIn, Shanghai-based “Ushi is focused on helping 
its members to expand and maximize the value of their professional 
networks, to achieve greater success.”108  
 
2.1.9.  Chinese & U.S. Social Media Categories Compared 
 
















                                               
105 Ushi.cn, LINKED IN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/www.ushi.cn 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).   
106 Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Ushi Is Embarrassing LinkedIn in China, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-asian-tech-       
companies-that-are-putting-american-ones-to-shame-2010-12?op=1.  
107 Ushi.cn, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/www.ushi.cn 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
108 Id. 
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The top twenty-five social media sites in the U.S sample are Ac-
ademia, Club Penguin, Facebook, Flixster, FriendFinder, Google+, 
Hi5, Imgur, Klout, LinkedIn, Match.com, Orkut, Pinterest, Reddit, 
Scribd, Skype, Steam, Technocrati, TripAdvisor, Tumblr, Twitter, 
Vine, WhatsApp, Yahoo!Group, and YouTube.  Eight of the twenty-
five U.S. social networks were shared interest sites (32%) as com-
pared to only one of the twenty-five Chinese sites (4%).  Five of the 
twenty- five Chinese social media sites (N=5, 20%) were Facebook-
like social networks, as compared to four of their American counter-
parts (N=4, 16%).  Thirty percent of China’s largest social media sites 
were classified as message or blog-based (N=6, 24%), as opposed to 
twenty percent of the U.S. sites (N=5).  Pinterest is the only virtual 
bulletin board in the top twenty-five U.S. sites.  The U.S. had two 
sites in the top twenty-five that were predominately professional or 
education sites while China only had one, Ushi. 
Table Three (below) depicts the chief sources of revenue for the 
twenty-five Chinese social network sites.  Data was publicly re-
ported on sixteen of the twenty-five leading sites.   
 

















Fifty percent of the sixteen Chinese social media sites chiefly 
profited from advertising.  Twenty-five percent of the sites relied 
upon virtual sales and services including online gaming.   
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Chinese social media sites, like their U.S. counterparts, are big 
businesses that commoditize users’ personal data, sell advertising, 
virtual goods, and services.109  Several of China’s established e-com-
merce websites developed social media and grafted them onto al-
ready popular sites.110  China’s eBay equivalent, Alibaba, grafted 
Taojianghu, a social networking platform, onto Taobao.com, the 
company’s main retail and auction site in 2009.111  Tencent,112 a lead-
ing telecomm in China, launched the first instant services platform, 
QQ in 1999113 and added the social media site, Qzone, in 2005.114  
Chinese media sites are particularly attractive to advertisers and 
ecommerce providers because they are far more likely to be used for 
making purchasing decisions than their equivalents in the United 
States and Western Europe.  An empirical study found that “82% of 
                                               
109 “For instance, social network games: allow interactions between players 
who are not directly connected to a console, are less elaborate and expensive, derive 
revenue primarily from advertising or in-game purchases, leverage an existing so-
cial network, and have a large user base.” Kickflip, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 
2d 677 (D. Del. 2013) (explaining advertising revenue models for social media). 
110 “The entertainment-based platform for Taobao in particular combines 
standard social-networking functions with original features that promote online 
purchases.  It goes a step beyond efforts to mix e-commerce and social networking 
by Western companies like Amazon.com and Facebook, said Benjamin Joffe, CEO 
of digital strategy and research company +8* (Plus Eight Star).” Owen Fletcher, 
China’s Alibaba Adds Social Networking to E-Commerce, IDG NEWS (Aug. 4, 2009), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/169575/article.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
111 Id. (“Alibaba is crafting social-networking platforms specifically to comple-
ment two of its core operations.  The beta version of a Web site with Facebook-style 
applications and a Twitter-style feed is being grafted onto Taobao.com, Alibaba's 
auction and retail Web site, a spokeswoman said.  A more professional platform 
that the spokeswoman likened to LinkedIn is being added to Alibaba.com, the 
group's business-to-business e-commerce operation.”).  
112 Tencent is thought of as a platform for the masses and was essentially built 
on the QQ Instant Messaging service.  With a QQ account, a user can get access to 
all of Tencent's different services.  In other words, it's the equivalent of a social me-
dia hub.  Yes, Tencent's social networking site Pengyou has lower numbers of active 
users than Weibo, and Renren.  However, because of its multiple platforms, it main-
tains the biggest community in China in terms of sheer registered users.  Yin Mei, 
5 Chinese Social Networks You Need to Watch, MASHABLE (July 12, 2012), http://mash-
able.com/2012/07/02/china-social-networks/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
113 “What’s QQ,” QWHATIS, http://www.qwhatis.com/what-is-qq/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2015).  
114 Tencent Qzone, The Largest Social Media Website in China, CHINA INTERNET 
WATCH, http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/tag/qzone/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015) (explaining, “Tencent created Qzone in 2005.  It allows users to customize 
their blogs, keep diaries, send photos and listen to music.  Gradually, Qzone has 
transformed from a personal space to the biggest social network open platform, and 
its monthly active users grew to more than 600 million.”). 
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Chinese social network users say that social media has influenced 
their purchase decision; in Singapore the figure is 74%; in Spain, It-
aly, and the U.S. the average is 55%; the average for the seven re-
maining countries surveyed is 42%.”115   
Many of the Chinese sites have diversified sources of revenue 
even more varied than their American counterparts.  For example, 
Renren utilizes both online gaming and advertising as revenue 
streams.  NetEase, the parent corporation of NetEase Weibo, a mi-
croblog, reported advertising revenue in its 2014 Third Quarter 
Unaudited Report: 
Our growth was led by a 16.8% increase in revenues from 
our online game services, a 60.1% increase in advertising ser-
vices and increasing contribution from our e-mail, e-com-
merce and others business, which improved by 252.5% com-
pared with the third quarter of 2013.116 
A Tencent holding company owns multiple social media net-
works.  The conglomerate’s largest profits come from mobile gam-
ing sales.117  Tencent’s terms of use requires its users to accept third 
party advertisements and promotional messages in return for using 
the service at no charge.118  
Premium services and subscriptions are appearing in the Chi-
nese social media space.  The social media giant reserves the right to 
impose tolls or fees in the future: 
Part of Tencent’s services charges a fee.  If you are using 
these services, please comply with the relevant agreements . 
. . .  Based on the actual need Tencent may start to charge fee 
                                               
115 M-Commerce, Social Media, ROPO (Research Online, Purchase Offline) Lead Re-
tail Trends, According to Digitas LBI Global Survey; 49% of Consumers Surveyed Say 
Smartphones Have Changed the Way They Shop; 88% Use the Internet to Research Online, 




116 NetEase Reports Third Quarter 2014 Unaudited Financial Results, PR NEWSWIRE 
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/netease-reports-
third-quarter-2014-unaudited-financial-results-282483671.html (Stating that “Ne-
tEase, Inc. (NASDAQ: NTES), one of China’s leading Internet and online game ser-
vices providers, today announced its unaudited financial results for the third quar-
ter ended September 30, 2014.”). 
117 Tencent Third-Quarter Profit Misses Forecast, SHENZHEN DAILY (Nov. 14, 
2014), http://www.szdaily.com/content/2014-11/14/content_10674577. 
118 Terms of Service, at §7.1, TENCENT QQ. 
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for services that are currently offered free.  Before modifica-
tions and changes start, Tencent will give a notice in the ap-
propriate service page.  If you do not agree with the modifi-
cations, you should stop using the service.119 
“Tencent’s total revenues were RMB19,808 million (USD 3,220 
million) in Q3 2014, an increase of 28% YoY.  Profit for the period 
was RMB5,676 million (USD 923 million), an increase of 46% 
YoY.”120  Ushi.com, a LinkedIn look-alike site, already charges its 
users for premium services: 
While Ushi bills itself as a straight-up professional network-
ing site, it has a more robust ecosystem that allows users to 
go beyond just making virtual connections.  For around $4 
Ushi members can apply for a job that pays at least $18,800 a 
year.  And sometimes those jobs come to members.  Jian 
Baoji, a recruiter, was scouring different websites for a chief 
marketing executive at a materials company and found the 
ideal one on Ushi.  Jian sent the prospective candidate a di-
rect message and, after some back-and-forth, got him hired 
in July with a salary of $170,000.  China’s recruiting market 
is booming, and it’s all about recruiting knowledge work-
ers.121 
 
2.1.10.  Chinese Social Media Gone Public 
 
Perhaps the best unobtrusive measure of China media sites’ fi-
nancial success is that nearly one in three parent companies of the 
top twenty-five Chinese social networks have gone public on U.S. 
stock exchanges in recent years.  When China’s “Twitter” floated on 
the U.S. stock market, it was celebrated in China.  The night Weibo 
went public a building in Nanjing’s CBD flashed the message:  祝贺
                                               
119 Id. at §8.1, §8.2. 
120 Incitez China, Tencent QQ MAUs 820M, Wechat MAUs 468M in Q3 2014, 
CHINA INTERNET WATCH (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/ 
10711/tencent-q3-2014/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
121 Hannah Seligson, Ushi Links in Mainland China, FORBES MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 
2012), available at http://www.forbes.com/global/2012/0116/companies-people-
dominic-penaloza-linkedin-connecting-china.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
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微博上市, [Congratulations to Weibo] for floating on the stock ex-
change.’”122  As Table Four, below, confirms, a number of these large 
Chinese social media sites were able to raise large sums in their U.S. 
IPOs.  Momo, China’s top hook-up application,123 went public on 
December 11, 2014 raising: “$216 million in its IPO.  The offering 
was priced at an average of $13.5, but went up to $17.02 on the same 
day.  On its first day of trading, the company’s shares soared 26%.  
Momo currently has a market capitalization of $2.27 billion.”124 
  
Table Four: Chinese Social Networks Gone Public 
Social Media                  
Name & Type 
Year of Public                
Offering 
Market Capitaliza-
tion or Other Valua-
tion 
Momo, (Chinese dating 
app)125 
2014 $2.21 billion market 
cap126 
                                               
122 Misha Maruma, The Complete Guide to China’s Major Social Networks, 
NANJING MARKETING GROUP (May 16, 2014), http://www.nanjingmarketing-
group.com/blog/complete-guide-china-social-media (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
123 John Russell, A Flirting App With 180M Users, Is Latest Chinese Tech Firm to 
File For A U.S. IPO, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 9, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/09/momo-a-flirting-app-with-180m-users-is-lat-
est-chinese-tech-firm-to-file-for-a-u-s-ipo/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
124 Troy Kuhn, Why Momo Inc. (MOMO) Slid Almost 14% Yesterday, BIDNESSETC, 
http://www.bidnessetc.com/31421-why-momo-inc-momo-slid-almost-14-yester-
day/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015) 2015) (“The social media company went public on 
December 11, raising $216 million in its IPO.  The offering was priced at an average 
of $13.5, but went up to $17.02 on the same day.  On its first day of trading, the 
company’s shares soared 26%.  Momo currently has a market capitalization of $2.27 
billion.”). 
125 Kurt Wagner, Chinese Social Network Momo Soars in NASDAQ Debut, RECODE 
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://recode.net/2014/12/11/chinese-social-network-momo-
soars-in-nasdaq-debut/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015); Sonali Basak & Bonnie Cao, 
Alibaba-Backed Chinese Chat App Momo Surges in U.S. Debut, Bloomberg, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-11/alibaba-backed-chat-
app-momo-raises-216-million-in-u-s-ipo (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (“The IPO comes 
as Momo’s co-founder Tang Yan is being accused of violating terms of his employ-
ment agreement by NetEase Inc. . . .  Tang has informed us [Momo] that he believes 
the allegation are malicious and intends to vigorously defend himself against 
them.”). 
           126 Companies in China, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/com-
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Social Media                  
Name & Type 
Year of Public                
Offering 
Market Capitaliza-
tion or Other Valua-
tion 
Sina,127 parent com-
pany of Sina Weibo128 
(Twitter-like mi-
croblog) 
2011 $2.46 billion market 
cap 
                                               
127 Sina Corporation (SINA), YAHOO FINANCE, https://in.finance.yahoo.com/q 
/pr?s=SINA (last visited Feb. 12, 2015); Top 10 Portal Webs in China, AGENT CHINA, 
http://www.agentchina.org/top-10-portal-webs-in-china.html (last visited Feb. 
15, 2015) (“SINA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates as an online media 
company in the People’s Republic of China. . . .  The company also offers SINA 
mobile, a mobile portal, which provides news information and entertainment con-
tent from SINA.com for mobile users in mobile browser and application format.  In 
addition, it operates Weibo.com that offers self-expression products to enable users 
to express themselves on Weibo platform; discovery products to help users dis-
cover content; notifications, such as games, VIP membership, and mobile apps; ad-
vertising and marketing solutions; and tools and application programming inter-
faces.  Further, the company offers MVAS, which allow users to receive news and 
information; download ring tones, mobile games, and pictures, customize caller 
ring back tones, and participate in dating and friendship communities.  Addition-
ally, it operates game portal that provides users with downloads and gateway ac-
cess to online games, information and updates on online and PC games, and value-
added application tools.  SINA Corporation also provides eReading, a one-stop 
shop for book reviews; and free email, VIP mail, and corporate email services for 
enterprise users, as well as operates a Website for bloggers to publish and read 
original writings.  The company was founded in 1997 and is headquartered in 
Shanghai, the People’s Republic of China.”) (Sina (Chinese: 新浪; pinyin: xīnlàng; 
i.e. “new wave”) is a Chinese online media company for Chinese communities 
around the world.  Sina operates four major business lines: Sina Weibo, Sina Mo-
bile, Sina Online, and Sina.net.  Sina has over 100 million registered users world-
wide.  Sina was recognized by Southern Weekend as the “Chinese Language Media 
of the Year” for 2003.)  
128 Propublicica, IPO Gives Us a Look inside Sina Weibo, A Company Struggling 
with Censorship, PACIFIC STANDARD (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/na-
ture-and-technology/ipo-gives-us-look-inside-sina-weibo-company-struggling-
censorship-79734 (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).   
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Social Media                  
Name & Type 
Year of Public                
Offering 
Market Capitaliza-
tion or Other Valua-
tion 
Sohu,129 parent com-
pany of “White-collar 
society”130 (general so-
cial networking) 
2000131 $2 billion market 
cap132 
Jiayuan (dating site)133 2011134 $100 million135 
                                               
129 Top 10 Portal Webs in China, AGENTCHINA, http://www.agentchina.org/ 
top-10-portal-webs-in-china.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“Sohu Weibo Sohu, 
Inc. (Chinese: 搜狐; pinyin: Sōuhú; literally: “Search-fox”) is a Chinese Internet 
company headquartered in the Sohu Internet Plaza in Haidian District, Beijing.  
This company and its subsidiaries offer advertising, a search engine, on-line multi-
player gaming and other services.”).  
130 Top 15 Social Networks in China, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/ 
top10/2011-05/12/content_22548834_4.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“White-col-
lar society,” also known as Bai Shehui in Chinese, is a real-name-registered social 
network site organized by Sohu, one of China's largest internet portals.  Founded 
in May 2009, the site features blogs, photos, music, gifts, and games, and its primary 
users are purported to be white collar.  As of March 2011, it had at least 30 million 
registered users, with 5.2 million active users.”). 
131 Id. 
132 Sina Corp., YAHOO FINANCE, https://in.finance.yahoo.com/q/co?s=SINA 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (stating Sohu’s market capitalization in a chart of Sino’s 
competitors).  
133 Chinese Dating Site Jiayuan Going Public, DATEPRO, http://www.datepro. 
com/chinese-dating-site-jiayuan-com-going-public/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
134 Alina Selyukh, Jiayuan.com Debut Caught in Chinese IPO Fatigue, REUTERS 
(May 12, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/05/11/us-jiayuan-ipo-debut-
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Social Media                  
Name & Type 
Year of Public                
Offering 
Market Capitaliza-
tion or Other Valua-
tion 
Weibo136 (microblog) 2014137 $2.87 billion138 
NetEase139 2000140 
 
$12.93 billion market 
capitalization; and 
revenues of $1.48 bil-
lion141 
                                               
136 Weibo Corporation [WB] to Ring The NASDAQ Stock Market Opening Bell in 
Celebration of IPO, WEIBO, http://ir.weibo.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=253076&p=          
irol-newsArticle&ID=1919786, (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“A microcosm of Chinese 
society and a cultural phenomenon in China, Weibo allows people to be heard pub-
licly and exposed to the rich ideas, cultures and experiences of the broader world.  
Media outlets use Weibo as a source of news and a distribution channel for their 
headline news.  Government agencies and officials use Weibo as an official com-
munication channel for disseminating timely information and gauging public opin-
ion to improve public services.  Individuals and charities use Weibo to make the 
world a better place by launching charitable projects, seeking donations and volun-
teers and leveraging the celebrities and organizations on Weibo to amplify their 
social influence.”). 
137 Id. (“Weibo is a leading social media platform for people to create, distrib-
ute and discover Chinese-language content.  By providing an unprecedented and 
simple way for Chinese people and organizations to publicly express themselves in 
real time, interact with others on a massive global platform and stay connected with 
the world, Weibo has had a profound social impact in China.  In March 2014, Weibo 
had 143.8 million MAUs and 66.6 million average DAUs.  Over 70% of our MAUs 
in December 2013 accessed Weibo from mobile devices at least once during the 
month.”); Weibo Corporation [WB] (“a leading social media platform for people to 
create, distribute and discover Chinese-language content, will visit the NASDAQ 
MarketSite in Times Square in celebration of its initial public offering (IPO) on The 
NASDAQ Stock Market today, April 17.”); Companies in China, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-region.aspx?region=Asia& 
country=China. 
            138 Companies in China, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/compa-
nies-by-region.aspx?region=Asia&country=China&page=3 (listing 2.87 Billion 
$/American Depository Receipts on NASDAQ). 
           139 Investors Questions, NETEASE, http://www.ideahk.com/website_link/ne-
tease/eng/html/investor_faq.htm#q4 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (Explaining that, 
“4.5 million ADSs (American Depository Shares equivalent to 450,000,000 common 
shares) were issued on June 30, 2000 at $15.50 per ADS.”). 
         140 Netease Inc., MSN MONEY, http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/stock-
details/fi-126.1.NTES.NAS?ocid=INSFIST10, (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
141 Id. 
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Social Media                  
Name & Type 
Year of Public                
Offering 
Market Capitaliza-
tion or Other Valua-
tion 
Youku Tudou Inc. 
(NYSE: YOKU) 
(China’s YouTube or 
Internet Television)142 
2010143 $3.54 billion on 
NASDAQ144 net reve-
nue (Q3): “Net reve-
nues were RMB1.11 
billion ($180.3 mil-
lion USD), a 29% in-
crease from the cor-
responding period in 
2013.”145 
                                               
142 Youku Tudou, Inc. (Form 6-K) (Nov. 2014)(Exhibit 99.1) Youku Tudou Part-




TRUNUSU9OX0VOVElSRSZzdWJzaWQ9NTc%3d (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“As 
the No. 1 app and web-based video platform in China, Youku Tudou leads the way 
in producing original content among Internet companies.  Top original content like 
Searching Divas, On the Road, the Tudou Video Festival and UGC channels have 
attracted fans to Youku Tudou, forming a large community over time.  Youku Tu-
dou’s monthly active user base has exceeded 500 million and its daily video views 
have passed the 800 million mark.  Youku App has most recently become the sec-
ond most popular Chinese mobile app in terms of user time spent, according to 
iResearch.  Youku Tudou’s ability in producing original content will provide strong 
support to the Xiaomi family of hardware by making the user experience more com-
pelling, and will help to boost average revenue per user.”). 
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Social Media                  
Name & Type 
Year of Public                
Offering 
Market Capitaliza-
tion or Other Valua-
tion 
Baidu146 (Parent Com-
pany of Baidu Tieba 
(Social Networking Site 
enabling creation of 
personalized home 
pages)147 
2005148 $80.67 billion149 
 
 
Part II, below, compares the American and Chinese equivalents 
for Facebook, Twitter, and Match.com.  The overwhelming conclu-
sion is that the Chinese equivalents tend to be larger than their 




                                               
146 The Baidu Story, BAIDU, http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p= 
irol-homeprofile (last visited Jan 15, 2015) (“We provide our users with many chan-
nels to find and share information.  In addition to our core web search product, we 
power many popular community-based products, such as Baidu PostBar, the 
world’s first and largest Chinese-language query-based searchable online commu-
nity platform, Baidu Knows, the world’s largest Chinese-language interactive 
knowledge-sharing platform, and Baidu Encyclopedia, the world’s largest user-
generated Chinese-language encyclopedia, to name but a few.  Beyond these mar-
quee products, we also offer dozens of helpful vertical search-based products, such 
as Maps, Image Search, Video Search, News Search, and many more.  We power 
these through our cutting-edge technology, continually innovating to enhance 
these services.  Our new Box Computing Open Platform brings users deep-linked 
content and even applications they can use directly through their search box.  We 
believe that Box Computing will dramatically improve people’s search experience 
and become ubiquitous across all Internet devices including computers and mobile 
platforms.”). 
147 C. Custer, Real-Time System Coming to Weibo, Tieba, and Other Chinese Web-
sites (for Real This Time), TECHINASIA (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.techi-
nasia.com/realname-system-coming-weibo-tieba-chinese-websites/.  
148 Investor FAQs, BAIDU, http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 188488&p= 
irol-faq_pf#26141 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (stating that Baidu (NASDAQ: BIDU) 
went public on August 5, 2005 on NASDAQ.). 
          149 Companies in China, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/com-
panies-by-region.aspx?region=Asia&country=China (last visited Jan 14, 2015). 
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3.  PART II:                                                                                                                     
THE LARGEST U.S. AND CHINESE EQUIVALENTS COMPARED 
 
Part II contrasts social media features and terms of use between 
some of the largest social networking sites in the United States and 
China.  The largest Chinese social media providers parallel the most 
popular American sites, but are dissimilar in consumer contracting 
practices, which reflects China’s socioeconomic, cultural and legal 
realities.150  Table Five, below, juxtaposes Facebook’s essential char-
acteristics with two of the largest Chinese equivalents, Renren and 
Tencent QZone.   
 
3.1. Facebook and its Chinese Equivalents  
 
Table Five: Facebook versus Chinese Facebook Equivalents 
                                               
150 Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same But Different, THE CHINA 
BUSINESS REV. (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.thomascrampton.com/china/social-me-
dia-china-business-review/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015)(“At first glance, China’s social 
media world closely parallels America’s leading social media providers but there 
are distinct differences, reflecting Chinese socio-economic and legal realities.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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book to stay con-
nected with 
friends and fam-
ily, to discover 
what’s going on 
in the world, and 
to share and ex-
press what mat-






















2004154 2005155 2005156 
                                               
151 Our Mission, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2015). 
152 Investor Relations, RENREN, http://ir.renren-inc.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 
244796&p=irol-irhome (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (“Renren Inc. operates a leading 
real-name social networking internet platform in China.  Renren, which means 
'Everyone' in Chinese, enables users to connect and communicate with each other, 
share information, create user generated content, play online games, watch videos 
and enjoy a wide range of other features and services.”); see also Renren, 
http://www.renren-inc.com/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
153 Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same But Different, CHINA 
BUSINESS REVIEW (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/social-          
media-in-china-the-same-but-different/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (“QZone 
(http://qzone.qq.com), the first and largest social networking site in China, attracts 
youth from teens through age 25, often from second- and third-tier cities.  A sizable 
portion of migrant workers, many of whom share personal diaries in a blog-like 
format, use QZone.”); see also The Story of China’s Biggest Social Network: Qzone, 
CHINA INTERNET WATCH (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/ 
3346/tencent-qzone/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (explaining Qzone’s rise to the top). 
154 Supra note 151. 
155 Yun Hee-Kim and Deborah Kan, Renren Plans to Sell Some Noncore Business: 
Chinese Social Network Company Also Weighs Investment in U.S., Hong Kong, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/renren-is-looking-to-divest-sev-
eral-non-core-businesses-1414476613. 
156 The Story of China’s Biggest Social Network: Qzone, CHINA INTERNET WATCH 
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/3346/tencent-qzone/ (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
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Attribute Facebook Renren Tencent 
QZone 
Number of          
Users 


























                                               
157 Id. (“1.39 billion monthly active users as of December 31, 2014”). 
158 Renren Had 219 Million MAUs, Less Login Users in Q3 2014, CHINA INTERNET 
WATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/10928/renren-q3-
2014/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).   
159 Tencent: 438M WeChat Users and 645M QZone Users by Q2 2014, CHINA 
INTERNET WATCH (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/8229/ten-
cent-q2-2014/#ixzz3Qk2YyC5D (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
160 Andrew Trotman, Facebook Revenues Pass $10bn For First Time, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysec-
tor/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/digital-media/11375735/Facebook-revenues-
pass-10bn-for-the-first-time.html (“Facebook revenues rose above $10bn (£6.6bn) 
for the first time last year after the social network made more money in the past 
three months than analysts were expecting.  The U.S. company said full–year reve-
nues hit $12.47bn as the firm succeeded in steering advertisers to its mobile plat-
form.”). 
161 This financial data is for the entire Tencent corporate family.  No data was 
available for Tencent Qzone alone.  See Incitez China, Tencent QQ MAUs 820M, 
Wechat MAUs 468M in Q3 2014, CHINA INTERNET WATCH (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/tag/qzone/#ixzz3Qk57dSl6 (describing 
Tencents growth and platforms). 
162 Revenue for Facebook FY 2014 up 58%, SOCIALBIZWIRE (Jan. 29, 2015). 
163 Our Mission, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2015. 
164 Renren Gains from Facebook's Absence in China, TREFIS (May 3, 2013), 
http://www.trefis.com/stock/renn/articles/171218/renren-gains-from-face-
books-absence-in-china/2013-05-03. 
165 Liz Gannes, How Tencent Became a 100b Company with a Portfolio of Apps, ALL 
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As Table Five, above, depicts, Renren is Facebook’s closest Chi-
nese equivalent166 in that it originated as a student-only networking 
tool that has broadened into a general purpose site.167  “Facebook 
entered the Chinese market in 2008,” becoming an immediate hit 
with 285,000 Chinese registered users in the first week.168  When Fa-
cebook was formally blocked in July 2009, indigenous Chinese pro-
viders seized the chance to develop innovative social media alterna-
tives.169   Renren has incorporated unique features that transcend 
Facebook’s fundamental attributes.  The Chinese social media giant, 
for example, launched a free “breakup app” that can eliminate all 
mentions of an “ex” on its network by clicking “start breakup.”170  
Renren has also expanded its revenue sources to include e-com-
merce activities such as group-buying discounts for members.171  
Qzone is another Facebook equivalent that allows for, “posting 
blogs, sharing photos, and interacting with other users.”172  Qzone 
is a social media hybrid combining leading features of Facebook and 
Tumblr, where users share photos, leave messages and blog.”173   
                                               
166 See Yin Mei, 5 Chinese Social Networks You Need to Watch, MASHABLE (July 12, 
2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/02/china-social-networks/ (last visited Feb. 
12, 2015) (“Think of RenRen as China's Facebook.  After a fierce competition with 
Kaixin (www.kaixin001.com), RenRen has come out on top.  Originally, RenRen 
lost a lawsuit about its domain name — www.kaixin.com — because it was so closer 
to Kaixin's.  Still, RenRen managed to retain ownership of that url, which now re-
directs to its site . . . .  RenRen is poised to take over as the social networking plat-
form for the college-educated population in China.”). 
167 Hello, MOP Hi,--New Social Networking Site by Oak Pacific, BTRAX, 
http://blog.btrax.com/en/2009/08/29/hello-mop-hi-new-social-networking-
site-by-oak-pacific/ (last visited Feb.  19, 2015). 
168 Facebook’s China Foray: China Real Time, Wall St. J. Blog (June 24, 2008) 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2008/06/24/facebooks-china-foray/ (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
169 Id. 
170 Li Qian, Breakup App' Deletes Cyber Traces of Ex-Lovers, No Fuss, No Muss, 
SHANGHAI DAILY (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.shanghaidaily.com/na-
tional/Breakup-app-deletes-cyber-traces-of-exlovers-no-fuss-no-
muss/shdaily.shtml. 
171 Renren gains from Facebook’s Absence in China, Supra note 164. 
172 Robin Wauters, China’s Social Network QZone Is Big, But Is It Really the Big-
gest? TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 24, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/02/24/        chinas-
social-network-qzone-is-big-but-is-it-really-the-biggest/. 
173 Facts and Statistics about Social Networks in China, STATISTICA, http://www. 
statista.com/topics/1170/social-networks-in-china/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
684 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
 
Despite offering analogous services, Renren’s and Tencent 
Qzone’s terms of use174 differ markedly from that of Facebook in 
ways that reveal the different legal and cultural norms of China.  Ta-
ble Six, below, compares clauses in the terms of use employed by 
Facebook and two of the largest Chinese functional equivalents: 
Renren and Tencent Qzone.  Neither of the Chinese equivalents in-
clude warranty disclaimers, hard caps on total recovery, nor do they 
incorporate choice of law and forum clauses like Facebook, which 
requires users to submit to jurisdiction in its home court in Califor-
nia. 
 
Table Six: Facebook’s Terms of Use versus Chinese Equivalents 
Terms of Use 
Clause 
Facebook Renren Tencent 
Qzone 
Title of User 
Agreement 
Statement of 




QQ Space       






Court for the 
Northern Dis-
trict of Califor-
nia or a state 
court located in 
San Mateo 
County178 
None None, users 
must submit 




                                               
174 Terms of Service, RENREN, http://renren.com/info/agreement.jsp (Renren’s 
“Terms of Service.”). 
175 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.          face-
book.com/legal/terms (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
176 Terms of Service, Supra note 174. 
177 QQ is an instant messaging service owned by Qzone, a China social media 
site.  See Echo Hu, Nanjing Marketing Group, Qzone: China’s ‘Most Valuable’ Social 




178 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Supra note 175. (Section 15 outlines 
where disputes can be resolved). 
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Terms of Use 
Clause 













Warranty           
Disclaimers 











Caps on         
Damages 
Greater of $100 
or amount user 




Mandatory        
Arbitration 
None None None 
Class Action 
Waivers 
None None None 
                                               
180  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Supra note 175  
181  QQ Space Service Agreement, Supra note 179. at § 10.3. 
182 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Supra note 175. 
183 Terms of Service, Supra note 174 at §9. 
184 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Supra note 175. (Facebook’s “caps on 
Damages” at Section 15). 
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Terms of Use 
Clause 










security law.185  





















Religious          
Prohibitions 





















Facebook’s boilerplate is only reachable by clicking on a hyper-
link located in miniscule font in the second row of eighteen hyper-
links at the bottom of its welcome screen.190  In sharp contrast to 
                                               
185 Terms of Service, Supra note 174 at § 9. 
186 Id. at §9(3) (b). 
187 QQ Space Service Agreement, Supra note 179 at §7.1(1)-(5). 
188 Terms of Service, Supra note 174 at §9(3) (e) (setting forth Renren’s “Religious 
Prohibitions”). 
189 Id. at §9(3) (d) (Renren’s “Incitement of Ethnic Hatred” clause). 
190  See also, NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 
(2013) (proposing a duty for providers to “draft reasonably”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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Renren’s terms of use, Facebook forecloses rights of users in their 
choice of law, choice of forum, and liability limitation clauses.  Ren-
ren’s only rights foreclosure clause, located in its terms of use, is an 
American-style warranty disclaimer.  Facebook’s boilerplate ex-
cludes every conceivable category of warranty and caps remedies 
for total damages at $100 or the amount in fees paid for the preced-
ing year: 
WE TRY TO KEEP FACEBOOK UP, BUG-FREE, AND SAFE, 
BUT YOU USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.  WE ARE 
PROVIDING FACEBOOK AS IS WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS 
OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
LIMITED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT.  WE DO NOT 
GUARANTEE THAT FACEBOOK WILL ALWAYS BE 
SAFE, SECURE OR ERROR-FREE OR THAT FACEBOOK 
WILL ALWAYS FUNCTION WITHOUT DISRUPTIONS, 
DELAYS OR IMPERFECTIONS.  FACEBOOK IS NOT 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS, CONTENT, 
INFORMATION, OR DATA OF THIRD PARTIES, AND 
YOU RELEASE US, OUR DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, 
EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS FROM ANY CLAIMS AND 
DAMAGES, KNOWN AND UNKNOWN, ARISING OUT 
OF OR IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH ANY CLAIM 
YOU HAVE AGAINST ANY SUCH THIRD PARTIES.  IF 
YOU ARE A CALIFORNIA RESIDENT, YOU WAIVE 
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE §1542, WHICH SAYS: A 
GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS 
WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT 
TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF 
EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM 
OR HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR 
HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.  WE WILL NOT 
BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR ANY LOST PROFITS OR OTHER 
CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, OR 
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF OR IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS STATEMENT OR FACEBOOK, 
EVEN IF WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY 
OF SUCH DAMAGES.  OUR AGGREGATE LIABILITY 
ARISING OUT OF THIS STATEMENT OR FACEBOOK 
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WILL NOT EXCEED THE GREATER OF ONE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($100) OR THE AMOUNT YOU HAVE PAID US 
IN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS.  APPLICABLE LAW 
MAY NOT ALLOW THE LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION 
OF LIABILITY OR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION OR 
EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.  IN SUCH 
CASES, FACEBOOK'S LIABILITY WILL BE LIMITED TO 
THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE 
LAW.191 
Facebook’s terms of use give users the right to retain the intel-
lectual property in all information they post, but the user must grant 
an exclusive worldwide license to the social media provider to use 
the data until the user deletes it: 
You own all of the content and information you post on Fa-
cebook, and you can control how it is shared through your 
privacy and application settings.  In addition: 1.  For content 
that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos 
and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the follow-
ing permission, subject to your privacy and application set-
tings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licens-
able, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content 
that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP License).  
This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your 
account unless your content has been shared with others, 
and they have not deleted it.192  
Renren’s terms of use, in contrast, does not claim a license or 
other right to user generated content, but reserves the user the right 
to use the provider’s intellectual property only when permitted: 
Oak Pacific Interactive [holding company of Renren.com]  
defines information  include but not limited to text, software, 
sound, photographs, video, graphics, advertisement in the 
entirety, business information  provided to the users.  Such 
contents are subject to the protection of copyright, trade-
mark, and the protection of other intellectual property laws 
and proprietary laws.  Therefore, the user can only use the 
                                               
191 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Supra note 175 at § 3. 
192 Id. at §2. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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contents authorized by the company.  Users can not create 
copies, modifies or create derivatives without the compa-
nies’ permission.193 
Facebook’s prohibited activities include a ban on spam, multi-
level marketing, third-party advertisements, viruses, pornography, 
and hate speech.194  These terms are typical of American social me-
dia providers that generally craft their categories of forbidden user 
conduct in ways that maximizes protection of the company’s pro-
prietary and corporate interests.  In contrast, Chinese social media 
providers’ terms of use focus largely upon protecting the state and 
the social order.  Renren’s terms of use, for example, are oriented 
toward preserving national unity without foreclosing users’ rights 
and remedies: 
To use the Internet, users must comply with relevant na-
tional policies and laws, including criminal law, national se-
curity law, privacy law, computer information system secu-
rity protection regulations, etc.; and protect national 
interests as well as national security.  Users who violated the 
laws and policies should bear the full responsibilities them-
selves.195 
Tencent Qzone, like Renren, includes clauses that proscribe post-
ings that undermine the social order, and national security inter-
ests.196  
                                               
193 Terms of Service, Supra note 174 at § 5, available at http://ren-
ren.com/info/agreement.jsp. 
194 Statement of Rights & Responsibilities, Supra note 175 at §3. 
195  Terms of Service, Supra note 174 at § 3-4. 
196 QQ Space Service Agreement, Supra note 179 at §7.1 (Users are forbidden from 
using Renren to post or send messages): 
(a) against the basic principles of the Constitution established; 
(b) endanger national security, leaking state secrets, subverting state 
power, undermining national unity; 
(c) harm national honor and interests; 
(d) incitement to ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination, undermining na-
tional unity; 
(e) violate the state religion policies or propagate cult and feudal supersti-
tion; 
(f) spread rumors, disturbs social order or undermines social stability; 
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3.2. Twitter and its Chinese Equivalents 
 
Weibo is Chinese for microblog.  China’s social media sites are 
disproportionately microblogging platforms similar to Twitter, but 
this “understates Weibo’s unique capabilities and leadership 
role.”197  As Table Seven, below, demonstrates, Tencent Weibo and 
Sina Weibo share many of the same functional attributes as Twitter, 
but are many times larger.  Sina Weibo registered a record “number 
of tweets per second during Chinese New Year [in 2012], with an 
average of 32,312 messages sent per second, as an astonishing 
481,207 messages were sent during the first minute of the New 
Year,” exceeding Twitter’s record.198  Sina Weibo, which is “accessed 
                                               
(g) spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder, terror-
ism or abetting crime; 
(h) insult or slander others, or infringe upon the legitimate rights and in-
terests of others; 
(i) contain other content laws and administrative regulations prohibited . 
4, users in the use of all network services process, must follow the follow-
ing principles: 
(a) comply with the relevant Chinese laws and regulations; 
(b) shall not be used for any illegal purpose network service system; 
(c) comply with all network services and network protocols, regulations 
and procedures; 
(d) shall not use Renren any network service system may adversely affect 
the normal operation of the act; 
(e) shall not use Renren network service system to transmit any harassing, 
libelous, abusive, threatening, vulgar or obscene, or any other illegal in-
formation; 
(f) shall not use Renren any network service system is not conducive to the 
Thousand Oaks company's behavior. 
197 Yin Mei, 5 Chinese Social Networks You Need to Watch, MASHABLE (July 12, 
2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/02/china-social-networks/# 
MbZMmnwRIuqm.  
198 Sina Weibo Saw a Record of over 32,000 'Tweets' Per Second During CFootnhi-
nese New Year, THENEXTWEB (Jan. 23, 20 
12), http://digital-stats.blogspot.co.za/2012/01/ sina-weibo-saw-record-of-over-
32000.html; See also, Jon Russell, Move Over Twitter, Sina Weibo Clocked 32,312 Mes-




32312-messages-per-second-during-chinese-new-year/)(discussing the record 
number of messages on Chinese app, Sina Weibo). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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by 22% of Chinese users[,] has enhancements such as the ability to 
include images, videos, comments, and photos in tweets,” which 
were introduced eighteen months before Twitter began implement-
ing these features.199   
Tencent Weibo is now available in English as the site moves to 
globalize its user base200 and Sina Weibo also has launched an Eng-
lish language site.201  Twitter launched an office in Hong Kong, even 
though its service has been blocked in Mainland China since 2009.202  
Table Seven, below, provides quick comparisons between Twitter 
and its two largest Chinese equivalents. 
 
Table Seven: Twitter vs. Chinese Equivalents 






















                                               
199 Id. 
200 TENCENT WEIBO, http://t.qq.com/?lang=en_US (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
201 “SINA English is the English-language destination for news and infor-
mation about China.  Find general information on life, culture and travel in China 
through our news and special reports or find business partners through our online 
Business Directory.” SINA, http://english.sina.com/weibo/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2015). 
202 Gerry Shih & Mirah Fahmy, Twitter Opens Hong Kong Office, Gains China 
Foothold, Reuters News (March 20, 2015). 
           203 IGI GLOBAL, What is Twitter?, http://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/twit-
ter/30754 (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
204 Michael Kan, China’s Tencent Launches English Version of Twitter, PC WORLD 
(Oct. 11, 2011) http://www.pcworld.com/article/241654/chinas_tencent_ 
launches_english_version_of_twitterlike_service.html (describing how Tencent’s 
popularity rose after Twitter was blocked in China). 
205 Laurie Dennis, Microblogging Chinese Style: Alum Has Sina Weibo for the Badg-
ers, WISCONSIN CHINA INITIATIVE (Oct. 2012), http://china.wisc.edu/news/ 
SinaWeibo.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (describing a University student’s expe-
rience using the Chinese social media site to promote his American university).  
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Attribute Twitter Tencent 
Weibo 
Sina Weibo 
Year Founded 2006 2010206 2009207 
Number of 
Users 
284 million208 820 million209 “500 million 
registered us-














                                               
206 Rip Emerson, Tencent v. Sina:  A Look at Who’s Winning the Battle for China’s 
Tweets INFOGRAPHIC (Aug. 5, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/08/05/tencent-
vs-sina-a-look-at-whos-winning-the-battle-for-chinas-tweets/ 
207 Xin Hu, Inside Sina Weibo: The Most Influential Social Platform in China, 
WCGWORLD (Sept. 29, 2014), http://blog.wcgworld.com/2014/09/inside-sina-
weibo-the-most-influential-social-platform-in-china (“Launched in August 2009, 
today Sina Weibo is not only the leading player in China’s micro-blogging space, 
but also the most influential platform in the overall social media landscape.”). 
208 Leading Social Networks Worldwide as of January 2015, Ranked by Number of 
Active Users (in Millions), STATISTICA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/ 
global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).  
209 Tencent QQ MAUs 820 M, Wechat MAUs 468M in Q3 2014, CHINA INTERNET 
WATCH (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/10711/tencent-q3-
2014/ (outlining the success of Tencent in terms of revenue and percentage 
growth). 
210 Yue Yao, Sina Weibo’s Balancing Act: Increase Revenue or Preserve User Expe-
rience?, MORNINGSTAR (May 22, 2014), http://analysisreport.morningstar.com/ 
stock/research?t=SINA&region=USA&culture=en-US&productcode=MLE. 
211 Alex Wilhelm, Twitter Beats In Q3 With Revenue Of $361M, But Slowing User 
Growth Drags Its Shares Down 8%, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/27/twitter-beats-in-q3-with-revenue-of-361m-
but-slowing-user-growth-drags-its-shares-down-8/. 
212 Tencent QQ MAUs 820 M, Wechat MAUs 468M in Q3 2014, Supra note 
209(“Tencent's total revenues were RMB19,808 million (USD 3,220 million) in Q3 
2014, an increase of 28%.”).   
213 SINA Reports Fourth Quarter and 2013 Financial Results (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://corp.sina.com.cn/eng/news/2014-02-24/150.html (Official press release 
including financial totals in dollars and percentage growth). 
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Attribute Twitter Tencent 
Weibo 
Sina Weibo 


















Table Eight, below, compares Twitter’s standard form boiler-
plate to that of its leading Chinese equivalents.  Twitter’s terms of 
use is an emblematic example of how a provider drafts its terms of 
use to serve as a systematic rights foreclosure scheme, while Tencent 
Weibo and Sina Weibo do not include American-style anti-con-
sumer clauses.  The Chinese sites, much like Renren and Qzone, pro-
hibit the use of their services to undermine the government and the 
public order.  This type of prohibition would be anathema to Twit-
ter, which follows American legal norms that enable free expression 
on its services.  Table Eight, below, compares Twitter’s terms of use 
to its Chinese counterpart’s mass-market contracts. 
 
  
                                               
214 Alyson Shontell, The Three Main Sources of Twitter’s 600 Million Revenue, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-
makes-money-2013-9. 
215 Tencent QQ MAUs 820 M, Wechat MAUs 468M in Q3 2014, Supra note 209 
(“Tencent's total revenues were RMB19,808 million (USD 3,220 million) in Q3 2014, 
an increase of 28%.”).   
216 Tracey Xiang, Four Years Later, Sina Weibo Monetization Finally Taking Off, 
TECHNODE FR. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://technode.com/2013/09/03/four-years-later-
sina-weibo-monetization-finally-taking-off/. 
217 Id. 
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Table Eight: Twitter’s Terms of Use vs. Chinese Equivalents 












vice (Subject to 
Tencent Terms 








Federal or state 















cable to the 
mainland ar-
eas of China223 
Chinese 
law224 










                                               
218 Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2015). 
219 Id. at §12(B). 
220 Service Agreement, TENCENT WEIBO, http://reg.t.qq.com/agreement.php at 
§10.4 (English translations on file with authors). 
221  Terms of Service, SINA WEIBO, http://weibo.com/signup/v5/protocol at 
§11.2. 
222 Twitter, Terms of Service, Supra note 218 at § 12 (B). 
223 Service Agreement, TENCENT WEIBO Supra note 220at §10.3 (English transla-
tions on file with authors). 
224 Sina Weibo, Supra note 221 at § 11.2. 
225 Twitter’s disclaimer clause states: “Your access to and use of the Services or 
any Content are at your own risk.  You understand and agree that the Services are 
provided to you on an "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" basis.  Without limiting the 
foregoing, to the maximum extent permitted under applicable law, THE TWITTER 
ENTITIES DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS, WHETHER 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.” Terms of Service, Supra 
note 222 at § 11(A). 
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Caps on         
Damages 
Cap of $100 or 
amount paid in 
preceding 6 
months.226 
None No caps on 
damages 
Mandatory       
Arbitration 
None None None 
Class Action 
Waivers 










tion of national 
laws, endanger 
national secu-















Religious         
Prohibitions 




None None None 
 
                                               
226 Id. at §11(C) (Twitter’s caps states that an aggrieved user’s recovery is lim-
ited to the: “GREATER OF ONE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS (U.S. $100.00) OR THE 
AMOUNT YOU PAID TWITTER, IF ANY, IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS FOR THE 
SERVICES GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIM.”). 
227  Service Agreement, TENCENT WEIBO Supra note 220at § 3.1.2. 
228 Sina Weibo does not mention national security but its service agreement 
addresses compliance with Chinese laws and regulations.  Services Agreement, Supra 
note 221 at § 4.9.3 (prohibits violations of “other laws, regulations, policies and pub-
lic order and morals, morality, etc.”). 
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3.3. Match.com and its Chinese Equivalents 
 
Table Nine, below, compares Match.com, the largest U.S. online dating 
site, with two of China’s most successful dating sites: Jiayuan and Momo.  
Match.com is approximately 1/42th the size of Momo and 1/26th the size 
of Jiayuan.  Momo allows users “to connect with people in your immediate 
area, using geo-positioning, for quick hook-ups.  It is popular amongst for-
eigners and Chinese students.”229  Momo is planning a new mobile appli-
cation targeting English speakers.230  Jiayuan.com International Ltd. is the 
largest online dating service in China providing “single adults with oppor-
tunities to meet, interact and form a long-term relationship aimed towards 
marriage.”231  Jiayuan.com, which “offers users free registration with full 
search access to its database” receives its revenue from “initial message 
fees, periodic subscription fees, and revenues from a number of fee-based, 
value-added services.”232  
 
  
                                               
229 Misha Maruma, The Complete Guide to China’s Major Social Networks, 
NANJING MARKETING GROUP (May 16, 2014), http://www.nanjingmarketing-
group.com/blog/complete-guide-china-social-media#ixzz3Nb4V92j4. 
230 Jon Russell, Momo, A Flirting App With 180 Million Users, Is Latest Chinese 
Techy Firm to File For a U.S. IPO (Nov. 9, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/ 
09/momo-a-flirting-app-with-180m-users-is-latest-chinese-tech-firm-to-file-for-a-
u-s-ipo/. 
 231 Jiayuan.com International Ltd., GOOGLE FINANCE, http://www.google.com 
/finance?cid= 2138098 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
232 Id. (“It charges either the sender or the recipient an RMB2.00 fee in order for 
an initial message to be readable”). 
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Table Nine: Match.com vs. Chinese Equivalents 
Attribute Match Jiayuan233 MOMO234 
Type of  
Service 
Online da-
ting           
service.235 






1995238 2003239 1997240 




110 million242 180 mil-
lion243 
                                               
233 Lin Liyao, Top 15 Social Networks in China, Chinaorg.cn (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2011-05/12/content_22548834_8.htm 
(“Jiayuan.com is considered the largest and the most popular dating site in China.  
Founded in October 2003, the site features online dating and various real-life blind-
dating activities.”). 
234 Troy Kuhn, Why Momo Inc (MOMO) Slid Almost 14% Yesterday; After Making 
an Impressive Start on the Nasdaq, the Social Media Company’s Stock Plunged on Monday, 
BIDNESSETC (Dec. 23, 2014) http://www.bidnessetc.com/31421-why-momo-             
inc-momo-slid-almost-14-yesterday/ (“According to a report by Brean Capital, 
LLC, Alibaba realized Momo’s potential back in 2012, and purchased a 21% stake 
for $100 million in the local mobile-based social networking platform.  Other inves-
tors in the company include Matrix Partners China, Yunfeng Capital, and Sequoia 
Capital.  Momo is in initial talks with Alibaba to step up its partnership, and is 
looking to enter the advertising business with the Chinese e-retailing giant.”). 
235 About Us, MATCH, http://www.match.com/help/aboutus.aspx?lid=4 (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2015).   
236 Jiayuan to Hold Annual General Meeting on December 15, 2015, JIUYAN INT’L. 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/jiayuan-hold-annual-general-
meeting-100000987.html (stating that Jiayuan International is the “operator of the 
largest online dating platform in China”). 
237 Kurt Wagner, Chinese Social Network Momo Soars in NASDAQ Debut, Re-
code, (Dec. 11, 2014) http://recode.net/2014/12/11/chinese-social-network-
momo-soars-in-nasdaq-debut/ (“Momo, a Chinese social network and dating plat-
form, finished its first day of public trading at over $17 a share — up more than 26 
percent from its IPO price.  It’s current market cap: $3.2 billion.”). 
238 MATCH, https://plus.google.com/+matchcom/videos (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015). 
239 20F SEC Filing, JIAYUAN.COM INT’L., (April 30, 2014), 2014 WL 6217578. 
240 Glogou China Media Guide: Digital, Online and Mobile, GLOGOU, 
http://www.thechinamarketing.com/china-online-marketing/mop.html (last vis-
ited Jan 25, 2015). 
241 How Many People Use Match.com, FIND THE DATA, http://dating-web-
sites.findthebest.com/q/273/1592/How-many-people-use-Match-com (last vis-
ited Dec. 23, 2015) (noting that Match.com has 4,288,595 monthly users).  
242 Jiayuan.com Surpasses 110 Million Registered User Accounts, JIAYUAN, (June 30, 
2014), http://ir.jiayuan.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=856970. 
243 Jon Russell, Momo, A Flirting App with 180 Million Users, Is Latest Chinese 
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$81,372,000245 $ 13.9 million 
(six months)246 
Sources 















In Table Ten, Match.com’s user agreement is compared to 
Jiayuan and MOMO, two of the most popular Chinese dating sites.  
Table Ten, below, provides an additional illustration of the differ-
ences in boilerplate language employed in American and Chinese 
social media user agreements.  Match.com’s terms of use shifts the 
risk of loss to the users, while eliminating rights and remedies, while 
the Chinese sites do not limit consumer rights.  Match.com’s terms 
                                               
Techy Firm to File For a U.S. IPO, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 9, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/09/momo-a-flirting-app-with-180m-users-is-lat-
est-chinese-tech-firm-to-file-for-a-u-s-ipo/.  
244 Match.com Information, Statistics, Facts and History, DATING SITE REVIEW, 
http://www.datingsitesreviews.com/staticpages/index.php?page=Match-com-
Statistics-Facts-History, (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
245 20F SEC Filing, Supra note 239. 
246 Leslie Picker, Chinese Chat Service Momo Files for U.S. Stock Offering, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-
07/chinese-chat-service-momo-files-for-u-s-stock-offering (“Momo, which began 
three years ago, generated $13.9 million in revenue during the first six months of 
2014, compared with $3.1 million in all of 2013.”). 
247 Michael Sebastian, IAC’s Romance with Online Dating Deepens as Revenue 
Grow, ADAGE (July 31, 2013), http://adage.com/article/media/iac-posts-higher-
revenue-strength-dating-sites/243404/. 
248 20F SEC Filing, Supra note 239 (“We [Jiayuan.com] began charging our users 
message fees on our online dating platform in October 2008.  Prior to this, we gen-
erated revenues primarily from charging for non-message related value-added ser-
vices, such as VIP memberships, priority search rankings and from selling adver-
tisement space on our platform.”). 
249 Josh Horwitz, Fifty Chinese Chat App Momo Passes 100 Million Registered Us-
ers, TECHINASIA (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.techinasia.com/flirty-chinese-chat-
app-momo-passes-100-million-users/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
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of use are an extreme example of a rights foreclosure scheme, con-
taining a variety of provisions that would be unenforceable in 
China.  Not only does Match.com cap damages at fees paid, but also 
it disclaims all warranties and eliminates all categories of damages.  
Match.com requires its users to submit to mandatory arbitration, 
even though the cost of arbitration will always exceed the total 
capped damages.  In addition, Match.com prohibits members from 
initiating or joining class actions, which effectively closes the door 
on any possibility of an asserted cause of action.  
The Chinese dating sites have relatively few rights foreclosure 
clauses, but Jiayuan has a mandatory arbitration clause like 
Match.com.  Jiayuan’s thirty-six word arbitration clause is incon-
spicuous, and almost completely uninformative.  Section eighteen of 
its user agreement, which addresses arbitration, makes no mention 
of the rules that apply, the cost, the location, the selection criteria for 
choosing an arbitrator, or any other information that would be use-
ful to the social media user: “Choice of Laws and Jurisdiction: The 
effectiveness, interpretation and dispute resolution arising of this 
Service Agreement are subject to the existing laws of [PRC].  Any 
dispute shall be submitted to the Beijing Arbitration Commission 
and the arbitration award is final.”250 
Match.com’s 813-word arbitration clause, which explains arbi-
tration and how to file a claim, is more than twenty-two times longer 
than Jiayuan’s cryptic provision.251  In contrast to Match.com’s more 
detailed arbitration clause, Jiayuan does not give its users any infor-
mation about whether or not it subsidizes the consumer in disputes 
before the Beijing Arbitration Commission, nor does the Commis-
sion provide any specialized consumer protections.252  Still, Ameri-
can courts would likely uphold Jiayuan’s arbitration agreement, fol-
lowing a long string of pro-arbitration decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.253  Chinese courts have yet to decide whether incon-
spicuous terms requiring arbitration of disputes will be upheld in 
the PRC.  
                                               
250 Terms of Service, JIAYUAN, http://reg.jiayuan.com/clause.php (last visited 
Feb 15 2015) at §18. 
251 Arbitration Procedures, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/registration/ 
arbitrationProcedures.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) at §1. 
252 BEIJING ARB. COMM’N, http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2015). 
253 AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), (striking down 
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Table Ten:  Match.com Terms of Use vs. Chinese Equivalents 
Terms of Use 
Clause 
Match.com Jiayuan MOMO 










Texas255 None None 
Warranty         
Disclaimers 
Total Disclaimer 




















                                               
California anti-class waiver contending that class actions are inimical to arbitra-
tion); Marmet Health Care Ctr. Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012) (holding that West 
Virginia’s bar on predispute arbitration in nursing home cases violated the Federal 
Arbitration Act by exclusion of category of cases; Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013) (upholding arbitration clause even though the cost of pursuing 
arbitration exceeded total possible recovery in state antitrust action); Marmet Health 
Care Ctr. Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 
S.Ct. 665 (2012) (holding in part that consumer claims arising under the Credit Re-
pair Organizations Act are subject to mandatory arbitration because Congress was 
silent on whether these claims were arbitrable.); Rent-a-Center, West Inc. v. Jackson, 
130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that under the Federal Arbitration Association, where 
decisions regarding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement have been as-
signed to an arbitrator, a district court may hear challenges on the enforcement pro-
vision specifically but challenges to validity must be decided by the arbitrator). 
254 Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM §19(a) (Feb. 5 2014), 
http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx [hereinafter Match.com, 
User Agreement]. 
255 Id. at § 19(d). 
256 Id. at §16(a)(d). 
257 Id. at § 18. 
258 Id. at § 19(a). 
259 Member Terms, JIAYUAN § 18, reg.jiayuan.com/clause.php. 
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Terms of Use 
Clause 
Match.com Jiayuan MOMO 
Class Action 
Waivers 
Yes, Give up 
right to partici-
pate in a class ac-






ger National              
Security 
No National secu-






Religious          
Prohibitions 
No Violate state 
religion, prop-





















If American social media providers required Chinese consumers 
to submit to warranty disclaimers and caps on damages, they might 
                                               
260 User Agreement, MATCH at §19(b). 
261 Member Terms, JIAYUAN § 8, reg.jiayuan.com/clause.php. 
262 User Agreement, MOMO, http://www.immomo.com/agreement.html at § 
4.2(1)(7) (user agreement on file with authors, Chinese and English translation us-
ing Baidu’s translator program) (“The basic principles of the Constitution deter-
mined opposition;(2) endangering national security, leaking state secrets, subvert-
ing state power , undermining national unity ; (3) harm national honor and 
interests; (4) to incite ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination , undermining national 
unity; (5) violate the state religion policies or propagate cult and feudal superstition; 
(6) spread rumors, disturbs social order or undermines social stability; (7) spread-
ing obscenity, pornography, gambling , violence, murder, terrorism or abetting 
crime.”).   
263 Member Terms, JIAYUAN, Supra note 261 at § 8.1. 
264 User Agreement, MOMO Supra note 262 at § 4.2(5). 
265 Member Terms, JIAYUAN, Supra note 261 at § 8.1. 
266 User Agreement, MOMO, Supra note 262 at §4.2(4). 
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expect to face class actions filed under China’s new consumer act.  
Part I and Part II of this article are, in effect, an early warning to 
American social media providers that they face a heightened litiga-
tion risk in China.  U.S. style rights foreclosure clauses, as we shall 
see in Part III, may face litigation and regulatory scrutiny in China 
where social media users have non-disclaimable rights and reme-
dies. 
   
4.  PART III:                                                                                                                      
TWO WORLDS OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTRACTS: CHINA VERSUS THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
 Our analysis in Part II highlighted dramatic differences in ap-
proach between American social networks’ terms of use agreements 
and their Chinese counterparts.  Part III first provides a comprehen-
sive statistical examination comparing twenty-five of the largest 
U.S. social media providers’ terms of use with their Chinese equiv-
alents.  This analysis will demonstrate that the findings in Part II are 
consistent with the larger pattern of Chinese versus American terms 
of use.  Part III then explores the doctrinal basis underlying these 
diametrically opposed mass-market agreements by comparing U.S. 
to Chinese contract law.  American terms of use contain provisions 
antithetical to Chinese contract and consumer law, while common 
Chinese terminology, unless localized to permit free expression, will 
not be enforceable for public policy reasons in either the United 
States or the European Union.   
 
4.1. Disclaimers of Warranty Clauses Compared: The United States 
versus China  
 
4.1.1. Chinese Warranty Disclaimers  
 
A few social media sites have localized their terms of use when 
targeting consumers outside of the PRC.    Only three of the twenty-
five Chinese social media providers incorporated warranty dis-
claimers in their terms of service (12%).  Of these three exceptions, 
WeChat, an instant messaging app owned by Tencent Company in 
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China, includes warranty disclaimers in its international version but 
not in its domestic terms of use.267  WeChat’s warranty clause in its 
international terms of use is indistinguishable from its American 
counterparts that disclaim all express and implied warranties: 
APART FROM THIS WARRANTY, TO THE EXTENT 
PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAWS AND 
REGULATION, ALL OF OUR SERVICES AND SOFTWARE 
ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE” 
BASIS AND NEITHER US NOR ANY OF OUR AFFILIATE 
COMPANIES MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION OR 
WARRANTY OR GIVES ANY UNDERTAKING IN 
RELATION TO OUR SERVICES, OUR SOFTWARE OR 
ANY CONTENT SUBMITTED, TRANSMITTED OR 
DISPLAYED BY OUR SERVICES, INCLUDING: (I) ANY 
REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR UNDERTAKING 
THAT OUR SERVICES OR SOFTWARE WILL BE 
UNINTERRUPTED, SECURE OR ERROR-FREE OR FREE 
FROM VIRUSES; (II) THAT OUR SERVICES OR 
SOFTWARE WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH YOUR 
DEVICE; OR (III) THAT OUR SERVICES OR SOFTWARE 
WILL BE OF MERCHANTABLE QUALITY, FIT FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NOT INFRINGE THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF ANY PERSON.  
TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAWS 
AND REGULATION, YOU WAIVE ANY AND ALL 
IMPLIED REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND 
UNDERTAKINGS.268 
While warranty disclaimers are rarely used in China, sixteen out 
of the twenty-five terms of use (64%) included a provision that users 
assume the risk of damages when they use their services.  Tencent 
QQ’s service agreement is a typical example: 
You understood and agreed that the Service is not designed 
for specific purposes, including, but not limited to, areas of 
nuclear facilities, military applications, medical facilities, 
                                               
267 Terms of Service, WECHAT (International Version), http://www.wechat. 
com/en/service_terms.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); WeChat (China Version) 
Terms of Service, http://weixin.qq.com/agreement?lang=zh_CN (English transla-
tions on file with authors) (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
268 Terms of Service (Revised Sept. 4, 2014), WECHAT (International Version), 
http://www.wechat.com/en/service_terms.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
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transportation and communications.  If the software or the 
services’ operation failure resulted in damages in person, 
property, environment, or elsewhere, Tencent is not liable.269 
Kaixin, also known as Happy Net, makes it clear that the user 
assumes all of the risk of using their service and is the functional 
equivalent of a general disclaimer: 
[Y]ou must be fully aware of the existence of such risks.  You 
expressly acknowledge and assume the risk of using Kaixin 
services.  Kaixin does not assume any responsibility.  Kaixin 
does not guarantee that service will meet your expectation 
nor does Kaixin guarantee that the service will be uninter-
rupted, secured and accurate.  Kaixin does not guarantee the 
accuracy and completeness of external links provided on 
Kaixin’s service.  Kaixin does not assume any responsibility 
of the content of these external links.270 
This “assumption of risk” provision does not divest Chinese 
consumers of their right to challenge defective software or services.  
The Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “Chi-
nese Contract Law”) enables customers to recover damages not-
withstanding the provider’s inclusion of an assumption of risk 
clause. 271   Under Article 149 of the Chinese Contract statute, a 
“buyer’s assumption of the risk of damage or loss of the subject mat-
ter” has no legal effect on whether a buyer can hold a seller liable for 
“non-conforming performance.”272 If the social media provider sup-
plied software that breached the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity and caused damages, the provider is liable for breach of contract 
even though the users has assumed the risk of using this software.273   
 
  
                                               
269 Service Agreement, TENCENT QQ, § 15.4 (English Translation on file with au-
thors); See also Services Agreement, MOP (English Translation on file with authors)  
270 Terms of Service, KAIXIN §7, http://www.kaixin001.com/s/reg.html (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
271 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Second Ses-
sion of the Ninth National People’s Cong.  March 15, 1999, effective on October 1, 
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4.1.2. Law of Consumer Warranties Compared: The United States 
versus China 
 
4.1.2.1. Express Warranties 
 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines warranties 
for the purchase and sale of tangible goods.274  Judges have little re-
course but to stretch U.C.C. Article 2 to software because the United 
States has no comprehensive law governing software or software 
services.275  The express warranties and implied warranties are spec-
ified in U.C.C. § 2-313 – §2-315.276  China has enacted functionally 
equivalent warranties in PRC Contract Law and the Law of the PRC 
Protection on Consumer Rights and Interests (“PRC Consumer Pro-
tection Law”).   
Article 153 of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 
is a functional equivalent of U.C.C. § 2-313, the express warranties 
provision, that requires the seller to deliver goods in compliance 
with the promises made by themselves.277 
Chinese Contract Law Article 153 states 
 
The seller shall deliver the subject matter in compliance with 
 the prescribed quality requirements.  Where the seller gave 
 quality specifications for the subject matter, the subject matter 
                                               
274 U.C.C. §2-313-§2-315. 
275 “While courts have attempted to stretch Article 2 to accommodate the li-
censing of intangibles, the principles of Article 2 do not correspond to the commer-
cial reality of licensing transactions in most significant respects.  For example, the 
performance obligations of a buyer under Article 2 are a poor match for the obliga-
tions of a licensee, as are warranties under Article 2.  Article 2 remedies are also ill 
equipped to address licensing transactions.  There is uncertainty whether a soft-
ware licensor has the right to include a disabling device in its program as the func-
tional equivalent of self-help repossession.  Article 2 allows a buyer to reject the 
whole product if it fails ‘in any respect to conform to the contract.’ Would this “’per-
fect tender rule’ of Article 2 permit a licensee to reject a program arbitrarily because 
it contains a few lines of errant code? The mass-marketing of some Internet security 
software applications most closely resembles the sale of goods, but even here there 
are significant differences.  For example, goods under U.C.C. sales law are freely 
assignable, whereas licensors typically attempt to restrict assignability.  This is far 
afield from an Article 2 sale.” Michael L. Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Com-
mercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 213, 273 (1995). 
276 Id. 
277 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 and PRC Contract Law, art. 153. 
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 delivered shall comply with the quality requirements set forth 
 therein.278 
 
Similar to U.C.C. § 2-313, the Law of the PRC Protection on Con-
sumer Rights and Interests (“2014 Consumer Protection Law”) Arti-
cle 23 Clause 2279 recognizes that product instructions and samples 
in displaying the products are express warranties created by the 
seller:280 “Business Operators who employ advertisements, product 
instructions, sample or other ways to display the quality state of 
their commodities or services shall guarantee that the actual quality 
of the commodities or services they supply is in conformity with that 
demonstrated.”281 Social media providers making representations 
about virtual or tangible goods could be subject to penalties for vio-
lating express warranties under current Chinese law.  Statistica esti-
mates sales of Chinese virtual goods for 2013 to be $7.4 billion.282  A 
“description of the goods” or “any sample or model” that is made 
“part of the basis of the bargain” are express warranties created by 
the seller under U.C.C. §2-313(1) (b)-(c).283  A special warranty pe-
riod exists in various regulations depending upon the industry in-
volved.  For example, under the Microcomputer Repair Exchange 
and Return Regulation of the PRC, the warranty period specified for 
the computer software is three months; for preinstalled software, a 




                                               
278 PRC Contract Law, art. 153. 
279 The former Consumer Protection Law also recognizes this provision in ar-
ticle 22.  See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer 
Rights and Interests (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peoples Congr. October 
31, 1993 effective January 1, 1994), art. 22, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn174en.pdf. (1993) (China).  
280 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 and 2014 PRC Consumer Protection Law, art. 23. 
281 2014 PRC Consumer Protection Law, art. 23. 
282 Estimated Revenue of Virtual Goods Sales in China from 2006 to 2010 With Fore-
cast Until 2013 (in Million U.S. Dollars), STATISTICA, http://www.statista.com/        
statistics/269323/sales-of-virtual-goods-in-china/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
283 U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b)-(c) (2002). 
284 Microcomputer Repair Exchange and Return Regulation of the PRC (微型
计算机商品修理更换退货责任规定 ), appx. 1, available at http://www.peo-
ple.com.cn/GB/it/49/149/20020806/793284.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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4.1.2.2. Implied Warranties 
  
Article 62 Clause 1 of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (“Chinese Contract Law”) is nearly identical to U.C.C. Sec-
tion 2-314(3) in creating an implied warranty predicated upon “cus-
tomary standards” or “industry standards.” 285   The “customary 
standard” or “industry standard” is similar to the “course of dealing 
or usage of trade” language used in U.C.C. Section 2-314 (3).286  
China, unlike the United States, does not allow a seller or vendor to 
disclaim implied warranties.  Nothing in Chinese contract law, in-
cluding Article 62 of the contract statute, allows the dominant party 
to require consumers or other buyers to waive implied warranties.  
In contrast, U.C.C. Section 2-316 permits implied warranties to be 
“excluded or modified.”287  The last sentence of Article 62 clause 1 
requires performance to comply with “any particular standard con-
sistent with the purpose of the contract.”288  This is similar to the im-
plied warranty of fitness for particular purpose as found in U.C.C. 
Section 2-315.289  Article 62, cl. 1 of the Chinese Contract Law pro-
vides, “If quality requirement was not clearly prescribed, perfor-
mance shall be in accordance with the state standard or industry 
standard; performance shall be in accordance with the customary 
standard or any particular standard consistent with the purpose of 
the contract.”290 
The 2014 Consumer Protection Law Article 23 clause 1291  re-
quires business operators to warrant the quality of their product or 
                                               
285 See U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (2002) (stating that “other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade); see also PRC Contract Law art.62 cl.1 
(stating that “the contract shall be performed in accordance with State standards or 
trade standards . . .”). 
286 Id. 
287 Id.  
288 PRC Contract Law, art. 62, cl.1 
289 See U.C.C. § 2-315(2002) (stating that “where the seller at the time of con-
tracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or 
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under section 
1302.29 of the Revised Code an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such 
purpose.”); see also Chinese Contract Law art. 62 cl.1.  
290 PRC Contract Law, art. 62, cl.1. 
291 The former PRC Consumer Protection Law recognizes this provision in ar-
ticle 22, clause 1.  See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Con-
sumer Rights and Interests (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. 
Oct. 31,1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994.), art. 22, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
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services under “normal operation.”292  This provision closely paral-
lels U.C.C. § 2-314 (2) (c)’s requirement that goods “to be merchant-
able must be at least fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used,” which is also classified as an implied warranty.293  
The 2014 Chinese Consumer Protection Law states, “Business oper-
ators shall guarantee the quality, function, usage and term of valid-
ity, which the commodities or services they supply should possess 
under normal operation or acceptance, except that consumer are 
aware of the defects before they buy the commodities or receive the 
services.”294  China’s implied warranties run with the product and 
are not disclaimable, unlike in U.S. consumer law.   
 
4.1.3. U.S. Freedom of Contract Approach to Disclaimers 
 
Our empirical data on American social media contracting prac-
tices demonstrates that U.S. social media providers routinely dis-
claim all implied warranties, which is contrary to mandatory Chi-
nese consumer provisions.  American social media providers 
universally eliminate all implied warranties with broad language, 
such as the statement that a computer program “is provided with all 
faults, and the entire risk as to satisfactory quality, performance, ac-
curacy, and effort is with the user” or similar words.295  Ninety-six 
percent of the top twenty-five U.S. social media providers (24 out of 
25) follow the methodology of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) in disclaiming the implied warranties of merchanta-
bility296 and fitness for a particular purpose.297  
                                               
edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn174en.pdf (1993) (China). 
292 2014 PRC Consumer Protection Law, art. 23, cl.1.  
293 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)(2002).  
294 2014 PRC Consumer Protection Law, art. 23, cl.1. 
          295 Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act, available at http://www.uniform-
laws.org/shared/docs/computer_information_transactions/ucita_final_02.pdf 
(2002) [hereinafter UCITA]; see UCITA Section 406(b)(1)(3) (disclaiming implied 
warranties). 
296 U.C.C. §2-316(2) (“Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention mer-
chantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous”). 
297 Facebook and Twitter both disclaimed warranties following the methodol-
ogy of U.C.C. §2-316.  See U.C.C. §2-316(2)-(3) (“to exclude or modify any implied 
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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U.C.C. Section 2-316 is the key provision for disclaiming warran-
ties and is notable for not incorporating any consumer protection, 
except in a few isolated jurisdictions such as Massachusetts. 298  
U.C.C. Article 2 liberally allows the dominant party to disclaim or 
modify all implied warranties by either words or conduct.299  The 
U.S. terms of use agreements we examined are, in effect, “boilerplate 
rights deletion schemes.”300  American-style terms of use masquer-
ade in the clothing of contract, but constitute a “coercive contracting 
environment” because of aggressive terms disclaiming warranties 
and limiting liability.301  U.S. courts seldom strike down overly ag-
gressive clauses by using the doctrine of unconscionability. 302  
China, in contrast, has a blanket prohibition against disclaiming im-
plied warranties of quality.   
 
                                               
298 See U.C.C. §2-316 (explaining the exclusion or modification of warranties); 
see also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-316A (prohibiting vendors from disclaim-
ing either the implied warranty of merchantability or the fitness for a particular 
purpose in consumer transactions). 
299 See U.C.C. §2-316 (2002) (permitting the exclusion of implied warranties). 
300 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, 
AND THE RULE OF LAW at 39–40, 204 (2013)(describing boilerplate rights deletion 
schemes that cancel or withdraw rights given by the legislature, such as warranties 
or remedies under U.C.C. Article 2). 
301 Id. 
302 Unconscionability is often pleaded but seldom successful.  See Song Fi Inc. 
v. Google, Inc. & YouTube, 72 F. Supp. 3d 53, 64 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that the choice 
of forum clause to be unconscionable);  See also, Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 
805 A.2d 1007, 1010-13 (D.C. 2002) (finding no unconscionability in agreement ac-
cepted by clicking online button and holding that “[a] contract is no less a contract 
simply because it is entered into via a computer”); Courts assess unconscionability 
by examining the consumer’s level of education, the relative disparity in the parties’ 
bargaining power; the parties’ relative sophistication; whether there is an element 
of surprise in the inclusion of the challenged clause.  Software vendors can defeat 
unconscionability claims by evidence that the clauses in dispute are conspicuous.  
The typical online licensee would not qualify as an illiterate or disadvantaged con-
sumer that the courts will protect. “Courts have developed ‘tests’ of unconsciona-
bility which look, as a matter of necessity, to the presence or absence in a given 
setting of certain oft-encountered ‘indicia’ of unfair bargaining.  One frequently 
cited case holds, for example, that unconscionability ‘generally . . . [includes] an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract 
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Carlson v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 883 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 
350 F.2d 445, 449, (D.C. Cir. 1965)).  
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 4.1.4. Chinese Antithetical Approach to Disclaimers 
 
Chinese social media providers in our sample rarely disclaimed 
warranties because Chinese law disfavors American-style standard 
form contracts, especially contracts taking the form of “take it or 
leave it” provisions that place consumers at a significant disad-
vantage.  Article 39 (2) of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic 
of China defines standard terms as “contract provisions which were 
prepared in advance by a party for repeated use, and which were 
not negotiated with the other party in the course of concluding the 
contract.”303  Terms of use are non-negotiated and prepared in ad-
vance by social media providers and are thus classified as standard 
form contracts under Chinese contract law.304  
Social media providers exporting their services to China would 
violate Chinese consumer law by attempting to disclaim warranties.  
Chinese law voids any boilerplate clauses if “the party that provides 
the standard clauses exempts itself from the liability, imposes heav-
ier liability on the other party, or precludes the other party from its 
main rights” under Article 40 of the PRC Contract Law.305  Article 40 
cross-references Articles 52 and 53 of the PRC Contract Law, which 
specifies certain situations when the standard terms are unenforce-
able.306  
A contract that violates Article 52 by attempting to “induce con-
clusion of the contract through fraud or duress,” or “conceal an ille-
gal purpose under the guise of a legitimate transaction” and “harms 
the interests of the state, the collective or any third party” is void.307  
This provision extends to all contracting parties in the PRC, includ-
ing social media providers.  In addition, Article 53 prohibits provid-
ers from disclaiming the liability for causing physical injury to the 
other party or disclaiming the liability for causing property damages 
                                               
303 PRC Contract Law, art. 39 (2) (defining “standard terms” in contracts).  
304 Id. 
305 See PRC Contract Law art. 40 (invalidating certain standard terms). 
306 Id. 
307 A contract is invalid in any of the following circumstances: “One party in-
duced conclusion of the contract through fraud or duress, thereby harming the in-
terests of the state; The parties colluded in bad faith, thereby harming the interests 
of the state, the collective, or any third party; The parties intended to conceal an 
illegal purpose under the guise of a legitimate transaction; The contract harms pub-
lic interests.” PRC Contract Law, art. 52. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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when there is intentional misconduct or gross negligence.308  U.S. 
courts have not yet recognized video games that are commonly 
played on Chinese and American social media sites as products for 
the purposes of products liability.  In a leading case, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected a products liability claim arising out of a 
Kentucky school shooting. 309   The plaintiffs contended that the 
school shooter “regularly played video games, watched movies, and 
viewed Internet sites produced by the firms.”310  The law of products 
liability has not yet evolved in the United States to compensate so-
cial media users for physical injuries or death caused by playing 
online games.311  Article 40 of the Chinese Contract law does not per-
mit a dominant contracting party such as a social media provider to 
“exempt itself from liabilities” or attempt to “impose [a] greater bur-
den on the other party.”312  The dominant party may not preclude 
the other party from exercising its “material rights” under a con-
tract.313   
Article 24 of China’s 2014 Consumer Protection Law prohibits 
business operators from including “format contracts, notices or an-
nouncements” to reduce their liability or impose greater burden on 
the consumer.314  This law invalidates many common American so-
cial media provisions such as caps on damages and warranty dis-
claimers.  Article 24 of the 2014 Consumer Protection Law provides, 
“[b]usiness operators may not, through format contracts, notices, 
                                               
308 See PRC Contract Law, art. 53 (stating when exculpatory provisions are in-
valid). 
309 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 701(6th Cir. 2002) (affirming lower 
court’s dismissal of product liability claims, finding that information “products” 
were not encompassed in Kentucky’s strict products liability statute “because 
thoughts, ideas, and expressions contained within defendants’ movie, games, and 
website materials did not constitute a “product’ within the realm of the strict liabil-
ity doctrine”). 
310 See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 688 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
“video games, movies, and websites were not ‘products’ for purposes of strict lia-
bility”); see also Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281 (D. Colo. 
2002) (dismissing actions based on negligence and strict liability in lawsuit filed in 
the Columbine school shooting case in which it was claimed that the killers were 
“fanatical consumers of violent video games and movies distributed on the Inter-
net”). 
311 Id. 
312 PRC Consumer Protection Law, art. 40 (where the dominant party complies 
with Articles 51 and 52). 
313 Id.  
314 PRC Consumer Protection Law, art. 24. 
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announcements, entrance hall bulletins and so on, impose unfair or 
unreasonable rules on consumers or reduce or escape their civil lia-
bility for their infringement of the legitimate rights and interests of 
consumers . . . (such content) shall be invalid.”315 
In addition, disclaiming the warranty of title or ownership also 
violates PRC Contract Law, which governs purchase and sale con-
tracts.316  Article 174 of the PRC Contract Law requires all non-gra-
tuitous contracts, in the absence of relevant provisions in contract 
law, to be handled “with reference . . . to the relevant provisions 
governing purchase and sale contracts.”317  Under provisions gov-
erning the purchase and sale agreement, the seller should warrant 
that there is no impairment to the goods and the ownership of the 
goods.318  A social media provider selling either virtual or tangible 
goods would be prohibited from disclaiming the warranty of title or 
non-infringement under this provision.   
Chinese mandatory contract law requires contract suppliers to 
“clearly identify the provision that limited his own liability or in-
creased the liability of the other party.”319  This is similar to U.C.C. 
Section 2-316 (2) and (3)’s requirement that the seller call the buyer’s 
attention to warranty disclaimers by making them conspicuous.320  
Article 10 of the 2014 amended Chinese consumer law requires 
terms in a standard-form contract that limit liability to be conspicu-
ous: “Terms in a standard-form agreement that materially affect a 
consumer will be effective only if they are conspicuous and draw 
the consumers' attention to the information about goods or services 
                                               
315 Id. 
316 PRC Contract Law, art. 174 (“Any other non-gratuitous contract shall com-
ply with laws containing relevant provisions and in the absence of such provisions, 
shall be handled with reference to the provisions governing purchase and sale con-
tracts.”). 
317 Id.  
318 See PRC Contract Law, art. 150; See also PRC Contract Law art 62, clause 1 
(stating that “where the parties have unclearly stipulated related contents in a con-
tract . . . the contract shall be performed in accordance with State standards or trade 
standards . . . .”). 
319 See PRC Contract Law, art. 39 (“The party supplying the standard terms 
shall . . . call the other party's attention to the provision(s) whereby such party's 
liabilities are excluded or limited, and shall explain such provision(s) upon request 
by the other party.”). 
320 See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2)-(3) (stating that in order to exclude or modify any 
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that has a material impact on the consumers.”321  Chinese law also 
requires the supplier of these standard terms to explain the provi-
sions upon request of the other party.322 
Chinese law also requires the supplier of these standard terms 
to explain the meaning of these provisions upon request of the con-
sumer.323 
 
4.1.5. The Enforceability of U.S. Disclaimer Clauses in China  
 
 Until recently, no Chinese court or regulator has weighed in on 
the enforceability of American-style terms of use that eliminate im-
plied warranties.  The twenty-five Chinese social networking plat-
forms rarely used the word “warranty” and almost never dis-
claimed warranties because these provisions are not enforceable.  
Guo Li v. Microsoft Corp., decided by Judge Jiangyin in Beijing Inter-
mediate People’s Court in 2011, is  an emblematic case study of how 
an American company’s one-sided warranty disclaimer was invali-
dated by a Chinese court.324  In Guo Li, a Chinese customer filed suit 
against Microsoft, challenging several clauses325 of their standard li-
censing agreement, which disclaimed warranties and limited the 
software publisher’s liability.  Clause 26 of Microsoft’s licensing 
agreement provides:  
To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, Mi-
crosoft and its suppliers provide to you the OS Component 
(“OS Component”), and any (if any) support services related 
                                               
321 See Ron Cai & Victoria Ding, Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Consumers to Take Effect on March 15, 2014, Davis, Wright & 
Tremaine Advisory (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.dwt.com/Amendments-to-the-
Law-on-the-Protection-of-the-Rights-and-Interests-of-Consumers-to-Take-Effect-
on-March-15-2014-01-07-2014/ (discussing Article 10 of the amendments to the 
Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Consumers to Take Effect on 
March 15, 2015). 
322 PRC Contract Law, art. 39.  
323 Id.  
324 Guo Li Su Microsoft（郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft), 
(Beijing Interm. People’s Ct. June 20, 2011), Pku.cn, available at http://pku-
law.cn/CLI.C.387520 (China). 
325 Note that the Jiangyin court renumbered the disputed clauses contained in 
the Microsoft licensing agreement and incorporated these clauses in her judicial 
opinion.  The numbering of the clauses in this case refers to numbers used in the 
judicial opinion.  The original Microsoft license agreement is not accessible.  
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to the OS Components (“Support Services”) as is and with 
all faults; and Microsoft and its suppliers hereby disclaim 
with respect to the OS Components and Support Services all 
warranties and conditions, whether express, implied or stat-
utory, including, but not limited to any (if any) warranties or 
conditions of or related to: title, non-infringement, merchant-
ability, fitness for particular purpose, lack of viruses, accu-
racy or completeness of responses, results, lack of negligence 
or lack of workmanlike effort, quiet enjoyment, quiet posses-
sion and correspondence to description.  The entire risk aris-
ing out of use or performance of the OS Components and any 
Support Services remains with you.326  
Microsoft’s clause is a typical American-style disclaimer of war-
ranties employed by the U.S. social media providers in our sample.  
American courts routinely uphold these disclaimers, so long as the 
seller follows the methodology of U.C.C. Section 2-316.327  Neverthe-
less, the Chinese court refused to enforce Microsoft’s standard dis-
claimer of warranty clause because it disclaimed the title of the soft-
ware and the implied warranties of merchantability in violation of 
the PRC Contract Law purchase and sale provisions.328  Article 174 
of the PRC Contract Law provides: “Any other non-gratuitous con-
tract shall comply with laws containing relevant provisions and in 
the absence of such provisions, shall be handled with reference to 
the provisions governing purchase and sale contracts.”329 
Under provisions governing the purchase and sale agreement, 
the seller must warrant that there is no impairment to the goods and 
the ownership of the goods.330  The Guo Li court ruled that the licen-
                                               
326 Microsoft Windows XP Licensing Agreement, noted in Guo Li Su Microsoft 
（郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft), (Beijing Interm. People’s Ct. 
June 20, 2011), Pku.cn, available at http://pkulaw.cn/CLI.C.387520 (Pkulaw.cn) 
(China).  
327 See U.C.C. §2-316 (stating the conditions for the exclusion or modification 
of warranties). 
328 Guo Li Su Microsoft (郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft); see 
also U.C.C. §2-316. 
329 PRC Contract Law art. 174. 
330 See PRC Contract Law, art. 150 (stating that seller should “guarantee that 
no third party shall claim rights against the buyer” over the goods delivered unless 
“the law provides otherwise”); see also PRC Contract Law art. 62, cl. 1 (stating that 
“in cases of unclear quality requirements, the contract shall be performed in accord-
ance with State standards or trade standards . . .”).  
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sor of the software must warrant the implied warranty of merchant-
ability of the software and that it is in the lawful position to license 
the software.331  The Chinese intermediate court invalidated Clause 
26, which attempted to disclaim both warranties of merchantability 
and authority.332  Microsoft appealed and the Beijing High People’s 
Court upheld the decision in June 2013.333 
Currently, no specific Chinese statute addresses warranty dis-
claimers employed by social media.334  Nevertheless, it is likely that 
Chinese courts will extend the Guo Li case to social media contracts.  
Under this decision, U.S. style warranty disclaimers, routinely in-
cluded in social media terms of use, violate PRC contract law.335  
Chinese courts could also strike down American warranty disclaim-
ers because these standard forms impose greater burdens on the 
other party and therefore violate Article 40 of PRC Contract Law and 
Article 24 of the PRC Consumer Protection Law.336 
The Guo Li case is the first successful PRC challenge to mass-
market style software license agreements, and is a template for 
which social media terms of use are enforceable and which are pre-
sumptively unenforceable.337  This case is emblematic in spelling out 
guideposts on how Chinese courts are likely to treat social media 
terms of use that contain one-sided terms favoring the dominant 
party.338   
In the post-Guo Li period, it is likely that users or the Chinese 
consumer associations will challenge one-sided provisions that, in 
effect, divest the social media customer of any meaningful remedy 
when the provider defaults or infringes rights.  American companies 
targeting the Chinese marketplace must comply with mandatory 
consumer law provisions or risk regulatory and court sanctions.  
                                               
331 Guo Li Su Microsoft （郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft). 
332 Id. 
          333 Judge Jiangyin, The Enforceability of Shrinkwrap License Agreement, SINABLOG, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_e12c8cce0101abb3.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
334 See generally PRC Contract Law; see also 2014 PRC Consumer Protection Law. 
335 The 2011 Guo Li case was decided before the 2013 amendments to China’s 
consumer statute went into effect.  The amended Chinese consumer law strength-
ens rights and remedies for all consumers in all contracts, making it even more 
likely that social media disclaimers will be invalidated. 
336 See previous discussion in the “Chinese Antithetical Approach to Disclaim-
ers” section. 
337 See generally Guo Li Su Microsoft （郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. 
Microsoft). 
338 Id. 
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American social media providers must not mechanically incorpo-
rate one-sided choice of forum clauses, limitations of liability, caps 
on damages, warranty disclaimers, or other U.S. style clauses in 
their agreements that unduly benefit the licensor.   
 
 4.2. Caps on Damages Compared: U.S. vs. China 
 
 4.2.1. Chinese Terms of Use & Capped Damages 
 
 Ten of the twenty-five Chinese social media sites (40%) dis-
claimed at least one category of damages (i.e., direct damages, con-
sequential damages, punitive damages).  Sixty percent of the Chi-
nese sites did not attempt to limit their liability in their terms of use 
agreement.  No Chinese social network capped damages at a nomi-
nal amount such as fees paid to the site.  
In contrast, twenty-four out of the twenty-five top U.S. social 
media sites attempted to limit liability in their terms of use.  Social 
media providers capped all categories including direct, indirect, 
consequential, special, and punitive damages.  Both Facebook and 
Twitter capped damages at no greater than $100 or fees paid for a 
given period.  Facebook, for example, disclaims all express or im-
plied warranties for its services and caps damages at $100 or the 
amount that the customer paid the SNS in the past twelve months: 
OUR AGGREGATE LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THIS 
STATEMENT OR FACEBOOK WILL NOT EXCEED THE 
GREATER OF ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($100) OR THE 
AMOUNT YOU HAVE PAID US IN THE PAST TWELVE 
MONTHS.  APPLICABLE LAW MAY NOT ALLOW THE 
LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY OR 
INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE 
ABOVE LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY 
TO YOU.  IN SUCH CASES, FACEBOOK'S LIABILITY WILL 
BE LIMITED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY 
APPLICABLE LAW.339 
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Similarly, Snapchat’s limitation of liability clause states that “in 
no event will Snapchat’s aggregate liability for all claims relating to 
the services exceed the greater of $100 usd or the amount you paid 
Snapchat, if any, in the last 12 months.”340  
Five of the U.S. social media providers capped total user recov-
ery at the fees paid to the social network during a fixed period, such 
as the last six months or a year.  Forty percent of the American social 
media providers eliminated all damages categories, which has the 
effect of creating a cap of zero.  One social media provider in the U.S. 
social media sample limited damages to $10 or less.  Seven U.S. so-
cial media providers limited user recovery to a nominal amount that 
ranged from $11 to $100.  Two providers (8%) capped damages be-
tween $500 and $1,000.  Only seven of the top twenty-five Chinese 
providers (28%) attempted to eliminate categories of damages in 
their terms of use.  Only one Chinese social media provider in the 
top twenty-five sites (4%) limited damages to a particular dollar 
amount ($10 or less).  
 
4.2.2. The Enforceability of U.S. Capped Damages Clause in China 
 
   In 2013, the Beijing High People’s Court upheld Judge 
Jiangyin’s decision, invalidating a standard limitation of liability 
clause in Microsoft’s license agreement.341  The Jiangyin court re-
fused to enforce Microsoft’s standard limitation of liability clause 
because it violated PRC Contract Law, Article 53, and Article 24 of 
the Law of People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer 
Rights and Interest.342  In the Guo Li case, the court invalidated Mi-
crosoft’s Clause 20,343 which stated:   
                                               
340 Terms of Service, SNAPCHAT (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.snapchat.com/ 
terms. 
341 Judge Jiangyin, The Enforceability of Shrinkwrap License Agreement, SINA BLOG, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_e12c8cce0101abb3.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
342 Guo Li Su Microsoft （郭力诉微软格式合同无效案）(Guo Li v. Microsoft), 
Note that, the 2011 Guo Li case was decided before the 2013 amendments to China’s 
consumer statute went into effect.  The amended Chinese consumer law strength-
ens rights and remedies for all consumers in all contracts and renumbered article 
24 as article 26 in the amended Chinese consumer protection law.  Cf. PRC Con-
sumer Protection Law (1994), art. 24 and PRC Consumer Protection Law (2014), art. 
26. 
343 Note that, the Jiangyin court renumbered the disputed clauses contained in 
the Microsoft licensing agreement and incorporated these clauses in her judicial 
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To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, except 
the warranty clauses, in no event shall Microsoft be liable for 
damages arising out of or in any way related to the use of or 
inability to use the software, including, but not limited to 
damages for loss of profits or confidential or other infor-
mation, for business interruption, for any other pecuniary or 
other loss whatsoever, even if Microsoft has been advised of 
the possibility of such damages.  Under all conditions, the 
liabilities of Microsoft hereunder shall be limited to the 
amount actually paid by you for the Software.  The foregoing 
limitations shall not be applicable to the items not exempti-
ble under applicable law.344 
 Article 53 of the PRC Contract Law invalidates the provisions in 
any contract that (1) excludes the dominant party’s liability for per-
sonal injury caused to a licensee; and (2) “[e]excludes one party’s 
liability for property loss caused to the other party by its intentional 
misconduct or gross negligence.”345  
The PRC court reasoned that Microsoft violated Article 53 of the 
PRC Contract Law by limiting its liability even when the provider 
has caused damages or injury by gross negligence.346  The Chinese 
court further reasoned that if Microsoft knew that the software 
would cause loss to the customer, the company was in the best po-
sition to make reasonable efforts to avoid such losses or damages.347  
Furthermore, the court invalidated a functionally similar clause.348  
In addition, the court held that the clause violated Article 24 of the 
Law of People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer 
                                               
opinion.  The numbering of the clauses in this case refers numbers used in the judi-
cial opinion.  The original Microsoft license agreement is not accessible. 
344 Microsoft Windows XP Licensing Agreement, noted in Guo Li Su Microsoft 
（郭力诉微软格式合同无效案 (Guo Li v. Microsoft), (Beijing Interm. People’s Ct. June 
20, 2011)(China), Pku.cn, available at http://pkulaw.cn/CLI.C.387520 (Pkulaw.cn). 
(English Translation). 
345 PRC Contract Law, art. 53. 
346 Guo Li Su Microsoft（郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft). 
347 Id. 
348 In Clause 27 of the Microsoft Licensing Agreement, Microsoft or other pro-
viders will not be responsible for any liabilities that arise from the function or the 
dysfunction of the “OS component” or supporting services, including but not lim-
ited to, loss of profit, privacy, personal injury, or any liability that arises due to 
failure to exercise reasonable care or good faith, even if Microsoft or other providers 
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Rights and Interests by limiting the company’s liability to the cus-
tomer purchase price.349  Under Article 24, “business operators may 
not, through format contracts, notices, announcements, entrance 
hall bulletins and so on, impose unfair or unreasonable rules on con-
sumers or reduce or escape their civil liability for their infringement 
of the legitimate rights and interests of consumers . . . (such content) 
shall be invalid.”350 
The Guo Li court concluded that the damage caused by the fore-
seeable risk of the software might be far higher than the software 
purchase price.351  By limiting damages, Microsoft reduced its civil 
liability for its infringement of the legitimate rights and interests of 
consumer, and therefore violated the law.352  Microsoft argued that 
the clause did not limit the whole liability, but only limited the lia-
bility to the maximum extent permitted by the law.  The court did 
not accept this argument and held the whole clause to be invalid.353  
The court also held that clause 28 violated Article 24 of the Law of 
People’s Republic of China on Consumer Rights and Interests, be-
cause it capped the liability of the defendant to a maximum of $5.354  
This monumental case sent a signal that Chinese courts will be pre-
disposed to police American-style rights foreclosure schemes that 
cap damages to a nominal amount or fees paid.  
 
 4.3. Mandatory Arbitration:  China vs. U.S. 
 
                                               
349 Guo Li Su Microsoft （郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft). 
350 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights 
and Interests (1993), art. 24, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/ 
laws/en/cn/cn174en.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
351 Guo Li Su Microsoft （郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft). 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 Microsoft Windows XP Licensing Agreement, noted in Guo Li Su Microsoft.（
郭力诉微软格式合同无效案） (Guo Li v. Microsoft), (Beijing Interm. People’s Ct. June 
20, 2011) (China), Pku.cn, available at http://pkulaw.cn/CLI.C. 387520 (Pkulaw.cn) 
(noting that in Clause 28 of the licensing agreement, Microsoftprovided that any 
damage suffered by the licensee will be compensated to the actual damage or 5 
dollars, whichever is higher.  This limitation of liability clause is applied to the max-
imum extent permitted by applicable law, even if the compensation failed its essen-
tial purpose).  
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Social media providers in China seldom impose forced arbitra-
tion clauses on their users.  Only five of the twenty-five Chinese so-
cial media providers specified that disputes were to be decided by 
arbitration (20%), and these clauses were often cryptic and unhelp-
ful.  No Chinese arbitration clause provided an explanation of arbi-
tration or gave a link to obtain information on the provider.  In three 
of the five Chinese terms of use imposing arbitration, the arbitral 
provider was specified.  Social media providers in our sample chose 
SIAC, the Beijing Arbitration Commission, and the China Interna-
tional Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.  The chief busi-
ness-to-business arbitral provider is the China International Eco-
nomic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”).355  CIETAC 
is one of the busiest arbitration institutions in the world, with an av-
erage of 1,300 cases handled annually.356   Nevertheless, CIETAC 
does not have specialized rules for consumer arbitration, let alone 
rules for social media disputes. 
Chinese arbitration clauses are placed, on average, 4,018 words 
within the interior of the boilerplate (Median=4,126), much like their 
U.S. counterparts.  Chinese social media providers afford users little 
information about arbitration.  The mean arbitration clause is only 
85 words in length (median=66 words).  American arbitration 
clauses have a median of 302 words.  None of the five Chinese media 
providers imposing arbitration mentioned the cost of arbitration or 
how costs would be divided between the provider and the user.  
American social media providers in our sample did not provide this 
information either.   
WeChat International, a platform that targets a globalized cus-
tomer base, drafted the most comprehensive arbitral clause: 
Any dispute, controversy or claim (whether in contract, tort 
or otherwise) arising out of, relating to, or in connection with 
these Terms, including their existence, validity, interpreta-
tion, performance, breach or termination, will be referred to 
and finally resolved by arbitration administered by the Hong 
Kong International Arbitration Centre under the Hong Kong 
                                               
355 GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 15, LATHAM & WATKINS (2014), avail-
able at http://www.lw.com/admin/Upload/Documents/Guide-to-International-
Arbitration-May-2014.pdf. 
356 See About Us, CIETAC, http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Feb. 
12, 2015) (stating that CIETAC “independently and impartially resolves economic 
and trade disputes by means of arbitration.”). 
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International Arbitration Centre Administered Arbitration 
rules in force when the Notice of Arbitration is submitted.  
The seat of the arbitration will be Hong Kong.  There will be 
one arbitrator only.  The arbitration proceedings will be con-
ducted in English.357 
The former Consumer Protection Law in article 34, clause 4, ad-
dresses Chinese consumer arbitration. 358   The validation of con-
sumer arbitration was also recognized in the 2014 amended Con-
sumer Protection Law article 39, clause 4.359   Jiayuan, a Chinese 
dating SNS, incorporates an arbitration clause in its terms of service, 
which states: 
The commencement of the registration provisions, perfor-
mance, interpretation and dispute settlement are applicable 
existing laws of the PRC, the dispute shall be referred to the 
Beijing Arbitration Commission, and the arbitration award 
is final.  The registration provisions due to conflict with the 
existing laws of the PRC resulting from ineffective part of the 
terms does not affect the validity of the remaining provi-
sions.360 
Forty percent of the top twenty-five U.S. social media providers 
coupled caps with mandatory arbitration clauses.  When American 
social media providers impose a hard cap on damages that is less 
than the cost of arbitration or litigation, the effect is to divest the 
consumer of any meaningful remedy.361  Of the ten social media pro-
                                               
357 Terms of Service, WECHAT (last modified Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.wechat. 
com/en/service_terms.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). 
358 PRC Consumer Protection Law (1994), art. 34 cl. 4 and PRC Consumer Pro-
tection Law (2014), art. 39, cl. 4. 
359 PRC Consumer Protection Law (2014), art. 39, cl. 4. 
360 Terms of Registration, JIAYUAN, http://reg.jiayuan.com/clause.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2015). 
361 LinkedIn’s Limitation of Liability clause states:   
“LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.  SOME COUNTRIES DO NOT ALLOW 
THE LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY IN CONTRACTS 
WITH CONSUMERS AND AS A RESULT THE CONTENTS OF THIS 
SECTION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.  Neither LinkedIn nor any of our 
subsidiaries, affiliated companies, suppliers, employees, shareholders, or 
directors (“LinkedIn Affiliates”) shall be cumulatively liable for (a) any 
damages in excess of five times the most recent monthly fee that you paid 
for a Premium Service, if any, or US $100, whichever amount is greater, or 
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viders mandating arbitration, seven also imposed an anti-class ac-
tion waiver: Skype, Academia, Pinterest, FriendFinder, Match.com, 
Hi5, and Flixster.  Twice as many U.S. social media sites mandated 
arbitration as their Chinese counterparts (5 of 25, or 20%).  None of 
the Chinese social media providers attempted to eliminate class ac-
tion lawsuits. 
China’s recent amendments to its consumer protection statute, 
which give provincial China Consumer Associations the right to 
bring public interest lawsuits, have been employed to challenge un-
fair or deceptive business practices.362  On December 30, 2014, nine 
months after the new law went into effect,363 the consumers’ associ-
ation from Zhejiang province filed the first consumer protection 
public interest lawsuit against the Shanghai Railroad Bureau. 364  
Zhejiang Consumers’ Association submitted a complaint to the 
Shanghai Railway Transportation Court alleging that Shanghai Rail-
road Bureau should not require consumers to repurchase their ticket 
when their tickets have been lost after the consumers registered to 
purchase the railway ticket with their real name.365  Zhejiang Con-
sumers’ Association is requesting an order from Shanghai Railway 
                                               
(b) any special, incidental, indirect, punitive or consequential damages or 
loss of use, profit, revenue or data to you or any third person arising from 
your use of the Services, any Platform Applications or any of the content 
or other materials on, accessed through or downloaded from LinkedIn.  
This limitation of liability is part of the basis of the bargain between the 
parties and without it the terms and prices charged would be different.  
This limitation of liability shall apply regardless of whether (1) you base 
your claim on contract, tort, statute or any other legal theory, (2) we knew 
or should have known about the possibility of such damages, or (3) the 
limited remedies provided in this section fail of their essential purpose; 
and not apply to any damage that LinkedIn may cause you intentionally 
or knowingly in violation of this Agreement or applicable law, or as oth-
erwise mandated by applicable law that cannot be disclaimed in this 
Agreement.  These terms may not apply if you have entered into a sepa-
rate agreement to purchase Premium Services with a separate Limitation 
of Liability provision that supersedes this section in relation to those Pre-
mium Services.” 
User Agreement, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
362 2014 Consumer Protection Law art. 47. 
363 The new consumer protection law became effective March 15, 2014.  
364 Real-name Ticket Lost to be the Replacement Ticket Zhejiang Consumer 
Protection Committee sued Railway Bureau, FIRENEWS, http://www.firein-
ews.com/news-9298493.html (last visited Feb.  21, 2015).  
365 Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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Transportation Court to enjoin this behavior.366  In January 9, 2015, 
the China Consumers’ Association at the national level announced 
their support on its website for the Zhejiang Consumers’ Associa-
tion’s use of the rights granted by the amended Consumer Protec-
tion Law to protect consumer rights.367  The threat of similar law-
suits will be a strong incentive for social media providers to include 
fairer terms for users.   
                                               
366 Id.  
367 China Consumers Association, The National Consumer Protection Association 
Supports Zhejiang Consumer Association for Initiating Consumer protection public inter-
est litigation, http://www.cca.org.cn/zxsd/detail/21389.html (last visited Feb.14, 
2015).  
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4.4. Contract Formation Methodologies Compared 
 
Chinese social media providers have adopted U.S.-style contract 
formation methodologies, but Chinese social media sites are less 
likely than top American social media sites to incorporate a browse-
wrap agreement in their terms of use.  Thirty-six percent of the top 
twenty-five Chinese media sites specify a browsewrap type agree-
ment as opposed to eighty-four percent of the U.S. social media sites 
(21 of 25).  Sixty percent of the Chinese providers (15 of 25) incorpo-
rate a rolling contract provision, reserving the right to amend the 
agreement upon notice to the user.  Seventeen of the twenty-five 
American providers (68%) employ a rolling contract provision.  Chi-
nese social media providers have declined to adopt rights foreclo-
sure clauses, in large part, because of mandatory Chinese consumer 
law prohibitions.  
 
4.5. Consumer Protection Compared: China versus the United States 
 
The overwhelming finding from the first section of Part III is that 
Chinese terms of use are more consumer-friendly.  However, the re-
cent amendments to China’s consumer law may be only the first step 
toward improving the rights of mass-market license agreements and 
other consumer contracts in China.  In the United States, consumer 
law is fragmented and sectorial while China’s consumer law pro-
vides comprehensive consumer protection for all contracts.  “On Oc-
tober 25, 2013, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress passed an amendment to the PRC Law on the Protection 
of Consumer Rights and Interests, effective March 15, 2014.”368   
China’s amended consumer statute includes “increased com-
pensation standards and penalties for violations; expanded liability 
for businesses involved in false advertising; the development of e-
commerce regulations; and the creation of consumer privacy protec-
tion standards.”369  Article 47 of the amended Consumer Protection 
Law provides for government-sponsored public interest lawsuits on 
                                               
368 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Amendments to Consumer 
Protection Law Allows for Public Interest Lawsuits with Limitations, (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/amendments-to-con-
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behalf of consumers in cases when “the rights and interests of a large 
number of consumers have been infringed upon.”370  The Guo Li 
court’s decision also suggests that Chinese consumer regulators and 
courts will be inclined to police American foreclosure clauses in so-
cial media boilerplate.  China’s consumer laws-in-the-books appear 
to regulate standard form contracting providing users with compre-
hensive protection.  Further study will be necessary of the Chinese 
consumer law-in-action to determine if government-sanctioned 
class actions are effectively policing one-sided mass-market license 
agreements. 
 
4.6. Chinese Terms Are Likely To Be Troublesome in U.S. Courts   
 
 4.6.1. Real-Name Registration in China    
 
In February 2015, the PRC National Internet and Telecommuni-
cations Administration enacted a regulation that requires users to 
register for blogs, instant messaging, and other social media services 
with their real names.371  Users can choose a “pen name” as their 
user name.372  Microblogging and messaging service providers are 
required to verify users’ identities.373  This regulation extended pre-
vious regulations and social media site requirements.  On December 
15, 2011, the Beijing Municipal Government had issued “Microblog-
ging rules which require Microblog users to register their identity 
with service providers.”374  Chinese consumers “must present an ID 
                                               
370 Id. 
371 Josh Chin, China is Requiring People to Register Real Names for Some Internet 
Services, WALL ST. J. (last modified Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/china-to-enforce-real-name-registration-for-internet-users-1423033973 (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
372 See National Network Information Office Issued “Account Ten” Specification 
Screen Name and Avatar, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 2, 2011), available at 
http://tech.qq.com/a/ 20150204/026840.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).   
373 Id.  
374 Sina Announces Issuance of New Rules on Microblogging by the Beijing Munici-
pal Government, PR NEWSWIRE-ASIA (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.prnews-
wire.com/news-releases/sina-announces-issuance-of-new-rules-on-microblog-
ging-by-the-beijing-municipal-government-135729318.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2015). 
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card or a mobile phone number to use social media accounts, mak-
ing it relatively easy to trace messages back to the source.”375  Under 
the Microblog Rules, users are required to “disclose their real iden-
tity information only to the microblogging service provider and may 
still use a pen name to reflect their account name on the front 
end.”376  
In 2012, Sina Weibo required users to register with their real 
names and Chinese ID numbers or a mobile phone number.377  Sina 
Weibo has not fully implemented the real name registration process, 
despite being required to do so under the “Microblog Rules.”378  Sina 
Weibo further disclosed to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission that they have made “significant efforts to comply with the 
verification requirements,” but they have been unable to verify the 
                                               
375 Leslie A. Pappas, Attorneys Say Use of Social Media Evidence in Chinese Courts 
is Rising, BLOOMBERG, BNA, SOC. MEDIA AND THE L. & POL’Y REP. (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/attorneys-say-social-n17179910756/. 
376 Steven Millward, Sina Admits to Investors It Has Failed to Implement Real Name 
Policy on Weibo (Apr. 29, 2012), https://www.techinasia.com/sina-admits-real-
name-not-implemented-weibo/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
377 Steven Millward, Real Name Checks on Weibo Won’t Come Cheap for Sina, Ten-
cent, TECHINASIA (Jan. 5, 2012), https://www.techinasia.com/weibo-real-name-
check-fee/. 
378 Millward, Supra note 376 (stating, “We are required to, but have not, verified 
the identities of all of our users who post on Weibo, and our noncompliance exposes us to 
potentially severe penalty by the Chinese government . . . .  On December 16, 2011, the 
Beijing Municipal Government issued the Rules on the Administration of Mi-
croblog Development, or the “Microblog Rules,” which became effective on the 
same day.  Under the Microblog Rules, users who post publicly on microblogs are 
required to disclose their real identity information to the microblogging service pro-
vider and may still use pen names to reflect their account names on the front end.  
Microblogging service providers are required to verify the identities of their users.  
In addition, microblogging service providers based in Beijing are required to verify 
the identities of all of their users by March 16, 2012, including existing users who 
post publicly on their websites.  The user identity verification requirements have 
deterred new users from completing their registrations on Weibo, and a significant 
portion of registrations with user identity information provided were rejected be-
cause they do not match the Chinese government database.  We have made signif-
icant efforts to comply with the verification requirements.  However, for reasons 
including existing user behaviors, the nature of the microblogging product and the 
lack of clarity on specific implementation procedures, we have not been able to ver-
ify the identities of all of the users who post content publicly on Weibo.  While the 
Microblog Rules are not clear regarding the type and extent of penalty that may be 
imposed on non-compliant microblogging service providers, we are potentially li-
able for our noncompliance and may be subject to penalties including the deactiva-
tion of certain features on Weibo, termination of Weibo operations or other penal-
ties imposed by the Chinese government.  Any of the above actions may have a 
material and adverse impact on our share price.”) (emphasis in original). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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identities of all of the users for a variety of reasons, including “exist-
ing user behaviors, the nature of microblogging product and the 
lack of clarity on specific implementation procedures.”379  
On August 7, 2014, China’s state Internet Information Office is-
sued a regulation on instant messaging apps, which also requires 
real name registration similar to the “Microblogging Rules.”380  To 
date, it is unclear when the real name registration will be fully im-
plemented by social media providers.  Jiayuan requires users to pro-
vide sufficient information so they can identify users in their privacy 
policy: 
(1) When you register for a Jiayuan account, or other Jiayuan 
products or services, visit Jiayuan website, or participate in 
any form of membership activities, Jiayuan collects your per-
sonally identifiable information.  Jiayuan also collects per-
sonally identifiable information from partners. 
 (2) When the user registration Jiayuan account, we will ask 
you for your name, nickname, email address, birth date, gen-
der, occupation, industry, personal income and a series of 
personal information successfully registered as long as you 
Jiayuan and login server, we will be able to identify you. 
(3 ) Jiayuan will automatically receive and record infor-
mation that your browser and the server logs, including but 
not limited to, your IP address, online, wireless information 
and other information. Jiayuan such information will be 
used: to improve web content to provide you meet your 
needs or to inform you of the latest products of a product, 
activity, activity information.381 
Tencent QQ also emphasizes that registrants must disclose their 
identity: 
You may need to fill in necessary information when register 
or use the Services.  If there are mandatory requirements in 
laws and regulations, you need to fill out this information, 
                                               
379 China Issues Regulations on Instant Messaging Apps, CRIENGLISH, http://      
english.cri.cn/12394/2014/08/07/2941s839456.htm (Aug. 7, 2014) (last visited Feb. 
22, 2015). 
380 Josh Rudolph, China Imposes New Restrictions on Instant Messaging, CHINA 
DIG. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014, 5:56 PM), http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/china-
imposes-new-restrictions-instant-messaging/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
381 Privacy Policy, JIAYUAN, http://www.jiayuan.com/bottom/private.html. 
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such as your identity.  If the information you filled out is in-
complete, you cannot use the Service or maybe restricted in 
using this Service.382 
In the United States, social media services vary significantly in 
their policies about allowing persons to register with a pseudonym 
or false information.  U.S. courts have extended the constitutional 
right to speak anonymously to online postings.383  Facebook, by far 
the largest American social media platform, prohibits users from us-
ing false information in their registration and Facebook users are re-
quired to provide their “real names and information.”384   However, 
with the recent rise of applications that enable users to anonymously 
post publicly, hidden identities in social networking is one of the 
fastest growing trends in the United States.385   
 
4.6.2. Chinese User Conduct Rules  
 
The PRC government has promulgated detailed regulations pro-
scribing the use of social media to subvert social order and commu-
nity harmony.  The Beijing Municipal Law on microblogging en-
acted in 2011, for example, specifically addresses what conduct on 
social media violates national security interests.386  This language 
                                               
382 Terms of Use, TENCENT, at §3.2; see also, §3.3 (“In general, you can always 
browse, modify the information they submitted, but for security and identification 
( e.g. number Ombudsman Service ) to consider, you may not modify the initial 
registration information provided during registration and other authentication in-
formation.”) http://www.qq.com/contract.shtml  (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
383 See e.g., Doe v. 2the Mart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
384 Statements of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.face-
book.com/ note.php?note_id=183538190300 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
385 Sarah Perez, Few Winners in Anonymous Social Networking, and Secret’s Not 
One of Them, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 18, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/18/ 
few-winners-in-anonymous-social-networking-and-secrets-not-one-of-them/ (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
386 The Beijing Municipal People’s Government Press and Publications Office, 
Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, Beijing Municipal Communications 
Management Bureau and Beijing Internet Information Office have formulated 
“[s]ome Beijing Municipal Provisions on Microblog Development and Manage-
ment”, which were promulgated on 16 December 2011, and took effect on the day 
of promulgation, Some Beijing Municipal Provisions on Microbog Development and 
Management, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Dec. 16, 2011), https://chinacopy-
rightandmedia.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/some-beijing-municipal-provisions-
on-microblog-development-and-management/#comments (last visited Feb. 10, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/4
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was prefigured in a 1997 PRC computer law statute387 and likely 
evolved from a 1994 computer law statute.388  Article 1 of the 2011 
statute states: 
In order to standardize microblog service development and 
management, safeguard network dissemination order, guar-
antee information safety, guarantee the lawful rights and in-
terests of Internet information service work units and mi-
croblog users, satisfy the public’s requirements concerning 
Internet information and stimulate the healthy and orderly 
development of the Internet, according to laws, regulations 
and rules such as the “Telecommunications Regulations of 
                                               
2015). 
387 Measures for Security Protection Administration of the International Net-
working of Computer Information Networks” that became effective in the PRC in 
199Article 5 reproduced below has almost identical chapter to Article 10 of the 2011 
Beijing regulation. 
No unit or individual shall use the international networking to produce, 
duplicate, search and disseminate the following information:  
(1) Information that instigates the resistance and disruption of the imple-
mentation of the Constitution, laws and administrative regulations;  
(2) Information that instigates the subversion of the state political power 
and overthrow of the socialist system;  
(3) information that instigates the splitting up of the country and sabotage 
of national unity;  
(4) information that instigates hatred and discrimination among national-
ities and sabotages solidarity among nationalities;  
(5) information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads rumours and dis-
rupts social order;  
(6) information that propagates feudalistic superstitions, obscenity, por-
nography, gambling, violence, murder and terror and instigates crimes;  
(7) information that openly insults others or fabricates facts to slander oth-
ers;  
(8) information that damages the reputation of state organs; and  
(9) other information that violates the Constitution, laws and administra-
tive regulations. 
“Measures for Security Protection Administration of the International Networking 
of Computer Information Networks” that became effective in the PRC in 1997, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182465 (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015).  
388 Laws of the People’s Republic of China, Regulations of the People's Repub-
lic of China for Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems (promulgated 
by Decree No. 147 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 18, 
1994, effective in 1994), art. 1-31, 1994 P.R.C. LAWS 147 (China)).  
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the People’s Republic of China”, the “Internet Information 
Service Management Rules,” etc., and integrating the real sit-
uation of this municipality, these Provisions are formu-
lated.389 
Article 10 provides specific guidance on what activities are con-
sidered antithetical to national security and the social order:   
No organization or individual may unlawfully use mi-
croblogs to produce, reproduce, publish or disseminate in-
formation having the following content: 
(1) content violating the basic principles determined in the 
Constitution; 
(2) content endangering national security, divulging State se-
crets, subverting the national regime or destroying national 
unity; 
(3) content harming State honour or interest; 
(4) content inciting ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination, 
destroying ethnic unity; 
(5) content destroying State religious policies, propagating 
heresy and feudal superstitions; 
(6) content disseminating rumours, disordering social order, 
destroying social stability; 
(7) content disseminating obscenity, pornography, gam-
bling, violence, terror or instigating crime; 
(8) content insulting or slandering others, violating others’ 
lawful rights and interests; 
(9) inciting illegal assemblies, associations, demonstrations, 
marches, mobs or disordering social order; 
(10) content using the name of illegal non-governmental or-
ganizations; 
(11) other content prohibited by laws and administrative reg-
ulations.390 
                                               
389 Some Beijing Municipal Provisions on Microbog Development and Management, 
art. 1, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Dec. 16, 2011). 
390 Id. at art. 10. 
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All but a few Chinese social media terms of use incorporate 
clauses in their terms of service that warn users not to undermine 
“national security and unity” as well as to avoid “conduct that un-
dermines social stability, contravenes public order and morals” or 
engage in other abusive online behavior.391  Similarly, Sohu’s service 
agreement lists enabling national security and public interest as rea-
sons for its existence: 
In order to protect the network and information security, 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, legal 
persons and other organizations, safeguard national security 
and public interests, in accordance with national laws and 
regulations and the relevant provisions of the NPC Standing 
Committee, Beijing Sohu Internet Information Service Co., 
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Sohu") to develop and pro-
vide network services in accordance with this agreement.392 
TianYa’s terms of service code of conduct is another example of 
a Chinese social media platform adopting the PRC regulation 
against jeopardizing national security or undermining national 
unity393  Balancing Chinese norms of social order with free expres-
sion will be difficult for American companies.  U.S. users, for exam-
ple, may boycott social media sites that restrict discussions of reli-
gion on their Chinese subsidiaries.  U.S. religious broadcasters are 
already protesting what they view as “exclusion from social me-
dia.”394  
Google decided to withdraw from the Chinese mainland market 
in 2010 and moved its server to Hong Kong where the content will 
not be blocked,395 although it is planning a return to Mainland China 
                                               
391 The Beijing Municipal People’s Government Press and Publications Office, 
Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, Beijing Municipal Communications 
Management Bureau and Beijing Internet Information Office have formulated 
“Some Beijing Municipal Provisions on Microblog Development and Manage-
ment,” which are promulgated on 16 December 2011, and take effect on the day of 
promulgation.  Some Beijing Municipal Provisions on Microbog Development and Man-
agement, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Dec. 16, 2011). 
392 Sohu Service Agreement, SOHU WEIBO, http://passport.sohu.com/ web/ ser-
viceitem.jsp (English translations on file with authors) (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
393 User Registration Agreement, TIANYA at §4.2, http://service.tianya.cn/ 
guize/regist.do (English Translation file with authors) (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
394 Religious Broadcasters Protest Exclusion from Social Media, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Feb. 21, 2012) http://archive.11alive.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid= 
228917. 
395 Tim Shi, Google Withdraws From China, STAN. DAILY (April 9, 2010), 
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in 2015 with an Android app store to install “on new smartphones 
made for the Chinese market that run on Google’s licensed version 
of Android.”396  LinkedIn, in contrast, agreed to “compromise on the 
free expression” on its site in China and was rewarded by being un-
blocked in 2014.397  LinkedIn's capitulation to Chinese governmental 
restrictions illustrates the reality that companies operating in foreign 
countries with radically different traditions must comply with local 
law.398  A representative for LinkedIn, Hani Durzy, made comments 
on the opening of this Chinese-language site: “While we strongly 
support freedom of expression, we recognized that when we 
launched that we would need to adhere to the requirements of the 
Chinese of the Chinese government in order to operate in China.  So 
the decision to proceed in China was one that we weighed heav-
ily.”399  
“If LinkedIn figures out how to navigate the operating environ-
ment in China, clearly other companies will try to imitate that,” said 
Kerry Rice, an Internet analyst at Needham, a brokerage firm.”400  
 
4.7. Globalization of Chinese Social Media: WeChat China vs. WeChat 
International  
 
The overwhelming Chinese emphasis on enjoining threats to the 
social order will inevitably lead to legal clashes with the United 
States and other Western countries unless the Chinese social media 
world localizes its terms of use to respect the fundamental right of 
                                               
http://www.stanforddaily.com/2010/04/09/google-withdraws-from-china/ 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
       396 Alistari Barr, Goole Pursuing a Return to China, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-negotiates-a-return-to-china-1441408051 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2015) 
397 Paul Mozur & Vindu Goel, To Reach China, LinkedIn Plays by Local Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/technology/to-reach-
china-linkedin-plays-by-local-rules.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
398 See Fahad Saleem, Facebook Inc. (FB) Dedicated Version for China Coming in 
2015, TECH INSIDER, Dec. 26, 2014, available at http://www.techinsider.net/face-
book-inc-fb-dedicated-version-for-china-coming-in-2015/1120471.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2015) (announcing a forthcoming version of Facebook for China). 
399 Paul Mozur & Vindu Goel, To Reach China, LinkedIn Plays by Local Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/technology/to-reach-
china-linkedin-plays-by-local-rules.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (quoting 
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free expression.  Some Chinese social media websites are already lo-
calizing their terms of use in order to tap the international market.  
WeChat, the world’s most popular instant messaging app, owned 
by Chinese Internet giant Tencent Company, reached 468 million 
monthly active users in the third quarter of 2014.401  WeChat is used 
by 23 percent of active users located around the globe.402  Statistica 
ranks Facebook Messenger second in popularity after WeChat.403  
WhatsApp, regarded as WeChat’s rival, ranks third world-wide, 
with 18 percent of global active users.  WeChat’s leading position is 
largely due to its success in the Chinese market, but WeChat is in-
creasingly targeting international users,404 reporting 100 million reg-
istered user accounts outside China in 2013.405  WeChat has con-
structed different terms of services for its Chinese users as opposed 
to its international users.406  WeChat’s international version applies 
to users anywhere in the world except China and to all users who 
are not Chinese citizens.407 
                                               
401 See STATISTA, Number of Monthly Active WeChat Users from 2nd Quarter 2010 
to 2nd Quarter 2015 (in Millions), available at http://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
255778/number-of-active-wechat-messenger-accounts/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) 
(reporting statistics on monthly WeChat users).  
402 See STATISTA, Active Usage Reach of the Most Popular Mobile Messaging Apps 
Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 2014, available at http://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
324794/mobile-messenger-app-reach/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (reporting statis-
tics on international usage of messaging apps). 
403 Id. 
404 See Jason Lim, WeChat, One of The World’s Most Powerful Apps, FORBES (May 
19, 2014), available at  http://www.forbes.com/sites/jlim/2014/05/19/ wechat-
one-of-the-worlds-most-powerful-apps/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (acknowledg-
ing WeChat’s efforts to make strategic, exploratory pushes into larger markets 
abroad).  
405 See Kaylene Hong, WeChat Passes 100M User Accounts Outside China, THE 
NEXT WEB (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://thenextweb.com/asia/2013/08/15/ 
whatsapp-rival-wechat-surpasses-100-million-user-accounts-outside-china/ (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015) (reporting WeChat’s announcement that it surpassed 100 mil-
lion users outside China). 
406 Compare Terms of Service, WEIXIN (CHINA) http://weixin.qq.com/agree-
ment?lang=zh_CN (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), with Terms of Service, WECHAT 
(INTERNATIONAL), http://www.wechat.com/en/service_terms.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2015) (reflecting WeChat international standards for all countries other than 
China). 
407 See Terms of Service, Introduction, WECHAT (INTERNATIONAL), http://www.w 
echat.com/en/service_terms.html (“These Terms apply to you if you are a user of 
our services anywhere in the world other than the People’s Republic of China (and 
you are not a citizen of the People’s Republic of China).”). 
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Table Eleven, below, depicts the differences between the indige-
nous WeChat terms of use and the terms that target international 
users.  WeChat’s international agreement includes American-style 
rights foreclosure clauses, but does not have social order or national 
security clauses like their domestic agreement.  
Table Eleven: WeChat International vs. WeChat China Terms of Use 




WeChat China   







trict of  Guangdong 
province of China409 
Choice of Law The law of the Hong 
Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region 
unless the applicable 
laws and regulations 






Total Disclaimer of 
Express and Implied 
Warranties except 
the use of reasonable 
care.412 
None 
                                               
408 See Terms of Service, Governing Law and Dispute Resolution, WECHAT 
(INTERNATIONAL), http://www.wechat.com/en/service_terms.html (“Any dispute, 
controversy or claim . . . will be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration ad-
ministered by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre . . . .”). 




410 See Terms of Service, Governing Law and Dispute Resolution, WECHAT 
(INTERNATIONAL), http://www.wechat.com/en/service_terms.html (“[T]hese 
Terms and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with these terms will 
be governed by the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”). 
 411 See Terms of Service, at § 12.3, WECHAT (CHINA), http://weixin.qq.com/ cgi-
bin/readtemplate?uin=&stype=&promote=&fr=wechat.com&lang=zh_CN& 
ADTAG=&check=false&nav=faq&t=weixin_agreement&s=default. 
412 See Terms of Service, Warranty and Disclaimer, WECHAT (INTERNATIONAL).  
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WeChat China   
Caps on Damages Capped at $100.413 None 
Mandatory                
Arbitration 
Binding Arbitration 






Yes, Give up right to 
participate in a class 




User Actions That                
Endanger Na-
tional Security 
No National security 
and social order.416 
Religious                  
Prohibitions 
No Violate state reli-
gion, propagate 








                                               
413 See Terms of Service, Liability for WeChat, WECHAT (INTERNATIONAL), (“[T]he 
total aggregate liability of us and our affiliate companies for all claims in connection with 
these terms . . . will be limited to . . . USD100.”). 
414  See Terms of Service, Governing Law and Dispute Resolution, WECHAT 
(INTERNATIONAL),  (“any dispute, controversy or claim (whether in contract, tort or 
otherwise) arising out of, relating to, or in connection with these Terms, including 
their existence, validity, interpretation, performance, breach or termination, will be 
referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered by the Hong Kong In-
ternational Arbitration Centre under the Hong Kong International Arbitration Cen-
tre Administered Arbitration Rules in force when the Notice of Arbitration is sub-
mitted.  The seat of the arbitration will be Hong Kong.  There will be one arbitrator 
only.  The arbitration proceedings will be conducted in English.”) 
415 See Terms of Service, Governing Law and Dispute Resolution, WECHAT 
(INTERNATIONAL), http://www.wechat.com/en/service_terms.html (“Each of the 
parties hereto irrevocably waives any and all right to trial by jury or to participate 
in a class action . . . .”). 
 416 See Terms of Service, at §8.1.2.1(2), WECHAT (CHINA) http://weixin.qq.com/ 
cgi-bin/readtemplate?uin=&stype=&promote=&fr=wechat.com&lang=zh_ 
CN&ADTAG=&check=false&nav=faq&t=weixin_agreement&s=default. 
 417 Id. at § 8.1.2.1(5).  
 418 Id. at § 8.1.2.1 (8). 
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As Table Eleven illustrates, WeChat’s international version em-
ploys American-style warranty disclaimers and caps total recovery 
at $100.  These anti-consumer clauses are not included in WeChat’s 
terms of use targeting Chinese consumers.419  WeChat’s strategy of 
formulating one set of terms for its indigenous market and another 
for the foreign market is one way to cope with radically different 
consumer rules.  American social media providers need to follow 
this example since they are already facing legal liability in the Euro-
zone.  As in China, welfarism in contract law in Europe has taken 
the form of mandatory terms giving the court the power to strike 
down unbalanced contract terms in social media contracts.  The Un-
fair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)’s Annex of Unfair Terms: 
“presumptively invalidates many widely used American-style li-
censing terms providing disclaimer of warranties, limitation of li-
censor’s liability, limitation of remedies for consumers, unilateral 
modifications to contract terms and contract acceptance by perfor-
mance.”420 
All twenty-five of the social media providers in the United States 
include a choice of forum clause in their terms of use.421  Courts in 
the United States generally uphold choice of forum clauses that com-
pel users to appear in the forum chosen by the provider.422  In the 
twenty-eight countries of the European Union, however, the Brus-
sels Regulation governing jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement of judgments in civil and commercial disputes mandates 
a pro-consumer home forum rule.423  American companies doing 
business in the European Union must comply with the Brussels Reg-
ulation. 
                                               
419 See Terms of Service, Warranty and Disclaimer, WECHAT (INTERNATIONAL), 
http://www.wechat.com/en/service_terms.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).  
420 Michael L. Rustad, GLOBAL INTERNET LAW (Hornbook Series) 360 (2014). 
421 Fifteen social media providers chose a location in North America, while ten 
chose an arbitral forum. 
422 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a 
forum selection clause mandating that cruise passengers will litigate in Florida); 
Forrest v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002) (upholding Verizon’s fo-
rum selection clause because the consumer had adequate notice of the clause and it 
was not unreasonable); Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695-96 (D. Md. 
2000) (upholding a choice of forum clause requiring all AOL customers to adjudi-
cate claims in Virginia). 
423 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
2003 O.J. (L 12), 16 Jan. 2001, arts. 15-17 (promulgating mandatory, nonwaivable 
right of EU consumers to sue in their home jurisdiction). 
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A French court of appeals recently ruled that a Facebook user is 
not bound by the provision that requires disputes to be brought ex-
clusively in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County.424 
“The regional court of appeals ruled that the provision violates Ar-
ticle 48 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that 
such a clause be highly visible.  The court also found that such a 
restrictive clause is only valid between businesses.”425  
In Union Federale de Consommateurs v. AOL France, the French 
court struck down thirty-six clauses in AOL France’s (hereinafter 
AOL) standard terms of use agreement, and further required the 
online provider to remove those clauses from their terms within one 
month.  Additionally, the court fined AOL for each day it delayed 
removing the objectionable clauses.426  “The French court ruled that 
AOL had a duty to notify its French customers of the resulting 
changes to its terms of use and imposed a fine of €30,000 against 
AOL; ordering the online provider to publish the substantive parts 
of the court’s judgment on its website and in three national daily 
newspapers.”427  American companies such as Apple have already 
modified many of their licensing agreements for the European con-
sumer marketplace in response “to a 2006 consumer advocate’s 
complaint that its standard form is unfair.”428   
These cases are not isolated but reflect a larger trend of courts 
and consumer authorities outside the United States refusing to en-
force American-style foreclosure schemes.429  German consumer as-
sociations have already challenged the standard form contracts of 
“CompuServe, AOL, and Microsoft: the first one was subject to a 
default judgment; the other two agreed to a binding cease-and-de-
sist declaration.”430  American social media providers with choice of 
forum and arbitration clauses violate the Unfair Contract Terms Di-
                                               
424 See Sébastien R. v. Société Facebook, Inc., Cour d’appel [CA][regional court 
of appeal] Pau, March 23, 2012.   
425 Michael L. Rustad & Maria V. Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of 
Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1145 (2012).  
426 See Bradley Joslove & Andréi V. Krylov, Standard American Business-to-Con-
sumer Terms and Conditions in the EU, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 2, 2–3 (2005) (highlighting 
the thirty-one clauses from the AOL terms that the Nanterre court declared null 
and void due to being either illegal or unfair). 
427  MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, GLOBAL INTERNET LAW (Hornbook Series) 367 (2014). 
428  Id. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. 
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rective, the Brussels Regulation governing jurisdiction and the en-
forcement of judgment and the Rome I Regulation governing choice 
of law.431  The lesson of the past fifteen years of U.S. social media 
contracting practices is that providers that do not localize their 
agreements to satisfy mandatory consumer law in other countries 
will face legal liability. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION:                                                                                                          
TWO WORLDS OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTRACTS AT ODDS 
 
The world of social media is increasingly divided into two radi-
cally different legal cultures — Chinese and the United States.  “The 
stark contrast between America’s ‘me-first’ culture and the ‘collec-
tive-good’ mentality in China is reflected in the two countries’ use 
of social networking sites.” 432   Chinese culture’s collectivism is 
group-oriented and its terms of use reflect concerns about social sta-
bility whereas American culture is largely about self-reliance and 
“freedom from externally imposed constraints.”433  These two dis-
tinctive social media cultures may clash as they enter into each 
other’s territory.434   
                                               
431 See MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, GLOBAL INTERNET LAW (Hornbook Series) 360, 368-
372 (2014). 
432 Andy Henion & Linda Jackson, Social Network Use Shows China, U.S. Differ-
ences, MICH. ST. U. TODAY (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://archives1.re-
search.msu.edu/stories/social-network-use-shows-china-us-differences (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2015)(discussing Linda A. Jackson, Jin-Liang Wang, Cultural 
differences in social networking site use: A comparative study of China and the 
United States, Computers in Human Behavior, 2013; 29 (3)). 
433 Some General Differences between Chinese and American Cultures, available at 
http://www.china-nafsa.aief-usa.org/culture/differences.htm (last visited Feb. 
15, 2015). 
434 “Collectivism versus individualism refers to the strength of the ties people 
have to others within the community.  Collectivism shows a strong group cohesion, 
and there would be a large amount of loyalty and respect for members of the group.  
Individualism indicates a loose connection with people, and there is a lack of inter-
personal connection and little sharing of responsibility, beyond family and perhaps 
a few close friends . . . .  Whereas United Stated (91) is a highly individualistic soci-
ety, in which people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family 
only.” Shan Luo, Cross-Cultural Differences Between American and Chinese College Stu-
dents on Self-Disclosure on Social Media, at 7 (2014) (M.A. Thesis, Iowa State Univer-
sity), available at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 4975&con-
text= etd (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (comparing China’s collectivism to U.S. 
individualism through social media use). 
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Currently, the two largest social media countries impose diamet-
rically opposed contracting practices.  The Chinese legal system 
does not permit social media providers and other dominant parties 
to disclaim warranties and limit liabilities.  China’s 2014 consumer 
statute arms the China Consumers’ Association, an NPO with gov-
ernment sponsorship, with increased power to initiate public-inter-
est class actions against providers that abuse their customers.  Chi-
nese providers follow Chinese contract and consumer laws in not 
including harsh warranty disclaimers, caps on damages, anti-class 
action waivers, or one-sided mandatory arbitration clauses that are 
common in the United States.  
Our empirical analysis of the terms of use of the twenty-five 
largest social media providers demonstrates that American boiler-
plate systematically forecloses consumer rights in ways that are un-
likely to be upheld in China or the European Union.  Providers in 
the United States frequently strip users of any causes of action based 
upon breach of warranty, cap damages at zero or a nominal amount, 
dictate class action waivers, and impose mandatory arbitration 
where the cost of filing far exceeds the amount at stake.  America is 
falling behind China’s social media in protecting consumer's rights 
in online transactions.  If the United States wants to continue to be 
competitive in the international arena and target the Chinese con-
sumer market, its social media providers must adopt a more con-
sumer-friendly approach, while Chinese social media will need to 
accept more free expression in their online terms of use. 
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